A Low-Cost Replica-Based Distance-Spoofing Attack on mmWave FMCW Radar

Miura, Noriyuki; Machida, Tatsuya; Matsuda, Kohei; Nagata, Makoto; Nashimoto, Shoei; Suzuki, Daisuke

doi:10.1145/3338508.3359567

Cited by 26 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 3 publications

(3 reference statements)

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“…Due to the fact that the mmWave radar is crucial in bad weather conditions, an attack to fool its measured distance is a critical physical security threat [7], [20]. Specifically, a distance-only spoofing attack [16], [18] was presented on a mmWave Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave (FMCW) radar. The system used a weak Arduino platform against an FMCW radar which used the less-common triangular waveform.…”

Section: B Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, beyond measuring range, FMCW radars are typically used to measure velocity, which they can achieve with high precision [5]. The attack method in [16] does not spoof the velocity measured by the victim at all.…”

Section: B Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Unlike [16], [18], which focused on radars using a triangular chirp waveform, our system addresses the modern saw-tooth waveform (so called "fast chirps"), as this chirp waveform is frequently found in contemporary FMCW radars in the AV industry [14], [25]. And unlike [23], we only require a single rogue radar within a vehicle in front of the victim.…”

Section: Our Contributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Spoofing Attacks Against Vehicular FMCW Radar

Komissarov¹,

Wool²

2021

Preprint

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The safety and security of the passengers in vehicles in the face of cyber attacks is a key element in the automotive industry, especially with the emergence of the Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) and the vast improvement in Autonomous Vehicles (AVs). Such platforms use various sensors, including cameras, LiDAR and mmWave radar. These sensors themselves may present a potential security hazard if exploited by an attacker.In this paper we propose a system to attack an automotive FMCW mmWave radar, that uses fast chirp modulation. Using a single rogue radar, our attack system is capable of spoofing the distance and velocity measured by the victim vehicle simultaneously, presenting phantom measurements coherent with the laws of physics governing vehicle motion. The attacking radar controls the delay in order to spoof its distance, and uses phase compensation and control in order to spoof its velocity. After developing the attack theory, we demonstrate the spoofing attack by building a proof-of-concept hardware-based system, using a Software Defined Radio. We successfully demonstrate two real world scenarios in which the victim radar is spoofed to detect either a phantom emergency stop or a phantom acceleration, while measuring coherent range and velocity. We also discuss several countermeasures to the attack, in order to propose ways to mitigate the described attack.

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Section: B Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: B Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Our Contributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Spoofing Attacks Against Vehicular FMCW Radar

Komissarov¹,

Wool²

2021

Preprint

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“…Given that the technical standards of the conventional FMCW system (modulation type, carrier frequency, bandwidth, and pulse period) are known, the attacker can synchronize with the victim radar. [20] recently demonstrates that the distance-spoofing attack on FMCW is feasible with low-cost off-the-shelf hardware. In the second model, two or more radars with identical parameters interfere with each other.…”

Section: B Adversary Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

BlueFMCW: Random Frequency Hopping Radar for Mitigation of Interference and Spoofing

Moon¹,

Park²,

Kim³

2020

Preprint

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Traffic safety is the foremost value that automotive radar systems aim to pursue. Unlike in mobile communication systems, the literature for radar systems did not adequately address inter-radar interference and security threats such as jamming and spoofing, which in turn threatens the traffic safety. In this context, we introduce a novel frequency-modulated continuous-wave (FMCW) radar scheme (namely, BlueFMCW) that mitigates both interference and spoofing signals. BlueFMCW randomly hops frequency to avoid interference and spoofing signals. Our phase alignment algorithm is capable of removing the phase discontinuity while combining the beat signals from the randomly-hopped chirps, and thereby radar's resolution is not compromised. The simulation results show that BlueFMCW can efficiently mitigate the interference and spoofing signals in various scenarios without paying its resolution.

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“…Spoofing attack is known as one of the most likely types of attack [3] owing to its simplicity of execution. An attacker only needs to listen to a signal to spoof and re-generate after any intended modification [4] [5]. Several prior attempts have appeared to address the issues of interference and spoofing attack.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

BlueFMCW: Random Frequency Hopping Radar for Mitigation of Interference and Spoofing

Moon

Park

Kim

2021

Preprint

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Radars form a central piece in a variety of emerging applications requiring higher degrees of localization. However, two problems are anticipated as more radars are deployed: viz., (i) inter-radar interference and (ii) security attacks. While many prior proposals have addressed the problems, no work in the radar literature addressed them simultaneously. In this context, we introduce a novel frequency-modulated continuous-wave (FMCW) radar scheme (namely, BlueFMCW) that aims to alleviate the damage from interference and active attacks (e.g., spoofing). The technique designs that the waveform randomly hops across multiple frequencies to dilute the damage at a certain frequency. Moreover, we propose a phase alignment algorithm to remove the phase discontinuity while combining the beat signals from the randomly-hopped chirps. The simulation results show that the proposed technique can efficiently mitigate the interference and spoofing signals in various scenarios without costing its resolution.

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A Low-Cost Replica-Based Distance-Spoofing Attack on mmWave FMCW Radar

Cited by 26 publications

References 3 publications

Spoofing Attacks Against Vehicular FMCW Radar

Spoofing Attacks Against Vehicular FMCW Radar

BlueFMCW: Random Frequency Hopping Radar for Mitigation of Interference and Spoofing

BlueFMCW: Random Frequency Hopping Radar for Mitigation of Interference and Spoofing

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