Abstract-
I. INTRODUCTIONPhysical layer security is a method for enhancing the security of existing wireless systems and networks by exploiting the random nature of the physical propagation channel, possibly providing perfect information theoretic security in some cases. In reciprocal channel key generation (RCKG), legitimate nodes observe a common fluctuating channel [2] to generate keys that are safe from the eavesdropper (Eve), in contrast to existing physical layer approaches that transmit random information through the channel and distill common randomness at Alice and Bob that is unobservable by Eve [1]. Advantages of RCKG are that perfect secrecy is attained without needing to estimate Eve's channel quality, full channel variability is available for key generation since channel state information (CSI) is never fed back between Alice and Bob, keys can be generated using buffered CSI data in contrast to methods that adapt transmission to the immediate channel state, and existing TDD systems could already support RCKG without any changes to the PHY or MAC.In previous work [5], [6], we derived expressions for the available key bits and those safe from an eavesdropper for MIMO systems with correlated complex Gaussian statistics and presented extensions to existing channel quantization (CQ) that dramatically reduce symbol error rate (SER). In this paper, we build on this foundation to investigate key generation limits and the performance of CQ methods for real LOS and NLOS scenarios based on new MIMO measurements in an indoor environment, revealing the true rate at which key bits can be generated as well as the required eavesdropper separation required for key bits to be secure.