A low‐cost node capture attack algorithm for wireless sensor networks

Abstract

SUMMARYWireless sensor networks (WSNs) have many micro devices that are easy to capture. In node capture attacks, the adversary physically captures sensors and extracts all information including key information from their memories, trying to compromise the system's security protection. However, the robust and random nature of many WSN security designs makes it difficult to compromise the system even with the capture of some sensors. In this paper, we approach WSN security from an adversarial point of view and investigate low-cost and efficient algorithms to identify sensors in a WSN in the shortest time with the lowest cost. Instead of randomly capturing sensors, an intelligent attacker should choose the next target based on the known topology so far. Because the identification of such has been proven to be NP-hard (non-deterministic polynomial-time hard), we propose to transform the problem into a set covering problem and develop a greedy minimum cost node capture attack algorithm (MCA) to lower cost of attack. Extensive simulations have been implemented to evaluate the performance of MCA and to compare it with several related schemes. It is shown that MCA lowers the cost of compromising WSNs by 16%.

A cost‐effective attack matrix based key management scheme with dominance key set for wireless sensor network security

“…Several attack models have been designed for WSN that exploits different vulnerabilities present in the network. The attacking models are based on several approaches namely UML methods, probability analysis, system theoretic, epidemic theory, vulnerability evaluation, and graph based . Hong et al defined attacking behavior using UML language.…”

“… Network modelWSN is presented as a graph G in which the vertex is the sensor node and edges are secure links between the communicating nodes of the network. The nodes are configured with random key predistribution in which 2 neighboring nodes can communicate only if they have a common key in their key ring Path modelVarious routing paths are formed between the source and sink nodes in a network.…”

“…Routing paths are composed of different links. Every link is secured by the cryptographic key k i , j by which network traffic can be sent encrypted and transmitted from node n i to the node n j . Even if a single link is compromised, the complete path gets compromised. Adversary modelThe attack algorithm is constructed from an attacker point of view, and it is assumed that the adversary is resource deficient. It has bounded potential and thus builds a cost‐effective attack matrix before mounting an attack in the network.…”

“…It has full knowledge of available physical routes and key identifier information that is exchanged during insecure message exchange during shared key discovery phase. It is able to eavesdrop on all insecure radio communication q ‐CardinalityIt represents the security strength of the link of the network.…”

“…Routing paths are composed of different links. Every link is secured by the cryptographic key k i , j by which network traffic can be sent encrypted and transmitted from node n i to the node n j . Even if a single link is compromised, the complete path gets compromised.…”