A limited defense of moral perception

McBrayer, Justin P.

doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9363-0

Cited by 57 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Perceptual Intuitionism is defended by McBrayer (2010aMcBrayer ( , 2010b, and on one reading of Audi (2013). 12 This view has been recently defended by Roeser (2011), who sees herself as developing the ideas of Thomas Reid.…”

Section: Contrast Arguments and The Contents Of Experiencementioning

confidence: 99%

Moral Perception and the Contents of Experience

Werner

2016

J Moral Philos

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I defend the thesis that at least some moral properties can be part of the contents of experience. I argue for this claim using acontrast argument, a type of argument commonly found in the literature on the philosophy of perception. I first appeal to psychological research on what I call emotionally empathetic dysfunctional individuals (eedis) to establish a phenomenal contrast betweeneedis and normal individuals in some moral situations. I then argue that the best explanation for this contrast, assuming non-skeptical moral realism, is thatbadnessis represented in the normal individual’s experience but not in theeedi’s experience. I consider and reject four alternative explanations of the contrast.

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Section: Contrast Arguments and The Contents Of Experiencementioning

confidence: 99%

Moral Perception and the Contents of Experience

Werner

2016

J Moral Philos

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“…See, e.g., Strugeon 2002, Huemer 2008, especially 4.4, Cullison 2010, McBrayer , , and Faraci forthcoming.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Värynen 2008, forthcoming, Huemer 2008, 4.4. Defenses of the claim that evaluative properties can figure in the contents of experience can be found in McBrayer , , Roeser , and Werner forthcoming.…”

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confidence: 99%

A Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism and the Problem of Cognitive Penetrability

Werner

2017

European J of Philosophy

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According to a posteriori ethical intuitionism (AEI), perceptual experiences can provide non‐inferential justification for at least some moral beliefs. Moral epistemology, for the defender of AEI, is less like the epistemology of math and more like the epistemology of tables and chairs. One serious threat to AEI comes from the phenomenon of cognitive penetration. The worry is that even if evaluative properties could figure in the contents of experience, they would only be able to do so if prior cognitive states influence perceptual experience. Such influences would undermine the non‐inferential, foundationalist credentials of AEI. In this paper, I defend AEI against this objection. Rather than deny that cognitive penetration exists, I argue that some types of cognitive penetrability are actually compatible with AEI's foundationalist structure. This involves teasing apart the question of whether some particular perceptual process has justification‐conferring features from the question of how it came to have those features in the first place. Once this distinction is made, it becomes clear that some kinds of cognitive penetration are compatible with the non‐inferential status of moral perceptual experiences as the proponent of AEI claims.

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“…4.4.See e.g. McGrath (), Chappell (), Cullison (), McBrayer (), Audi (), Cowan (forthcoming), and Werner (forthcoming).…”

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confidence: 99%