2020
DOI: 10.1109/jsyst.2020.2970427
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A Lightweight Certificateless Aggregation Signature Scheme With Provably Security in the Standard Model

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Cited by 17 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…The overall design rationale of this scheme was mainly inspired by Mei et al [15] and Deng et al [39]. In 2021, Mei et al [15] presented a conditional privacy preservation CLAS scheme with multiple security requirements in IoV based on bilinear pairings.…”
Section: Motivationmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The overall design rationale of this scheme was mainly inspired by Mei et al [15] and Deng et al [39]. In 2021, Mei et al [15] presented a conditional privacy preservation CLAS scheme with multiple security requirements in IoV based on bilinear pairings.…”
Section: Motivationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In addition, the security proof is provided in the random oracle model. In 2020, Deng et al [39] put forward the first provable secure CLAS scheme in SM, but it cannot be applied to VANETs because of its inability to resist replay attacks and lack of anonymity. To combine the advantages and solve the problems of the schemes proposed by Mei et al [15] and Deng et al [39], we propose a certificateless aggregate signature scheme with low verification delay, multiple security attributes and conditional privacy protection for VANETs in the standard model.…”
Section: Motivationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Some of them look similar since the schemes have been reproduced with minor modifications of the existing ones. In this paper, we show that recently proposed four CLS and CLAS schemes [16], [20], [21], and one CB-signature [23] scheme are insecure against universal forgery attacks, type I attacks, type II attacks or malicious-but-passive-KGC attacks. We then present design principles for construction secure CLS and CLAS schemes to prevent various algebraic attacks including our attacks.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 94%
“…We review Deng et al's scheme [20] and Tseng et al's scheme [21] proven secure in the standard model.…”
Section: A Cls and Clas Schemes In Standard Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
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