A library for light-weight information-flow security in haskell

RussoAlejandro,; ClaessenKoen,; HughesJohn,

doi:10.1145/1543134.1411289

Cited by 24 publications

(34 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…The implementation of the library and the examples described in this paper are publicly available in (Russo et al 2008a). The well-known concept of monads together with the light-weight and flexible characteristic of our approach makes the library suitable to build Haskell applications where confidentiality of data is an issue.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A library for light-weight information-flow security in haskell

Russo

Claessen

Hughes

2008

Proceedings of the First ACM SIGPLAN Symposium on Haskell

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Protecting confidentiality of data has become increasingly important for computing systems. Information-flow techniques have been developed over the years to achieve that purpose, leading to special-purpose languages that guarantee information-flow security in programs. However, rather than producing a new language from scratch, information-flow security can also be provided as a library. This has been done previously in Haskell using the arrow framework. In this paper, we show that arrows are not necessary to design such libraries and that a less general notion, namely monads, is sufficient to achieve the same goals. We present a monadic library to provide information-flow security for Haskell programs. The library introduces mechanisms to protect confidentiality of data for pure computations, that we then easily, and modularly, extend to include dealing with side-effects. We also present combinators to dynamically enforce different declassification policies when release of information is required in a controlled manner. It is possible to enforce policies related to what, by whom, and when information is released or a combination of them. The well-known concept of monads together with the light-weight characteristic of our approach makes the library suitable to build applications where confidentiality of data is an issue.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For any type A, and values a1, a2 :: A, a function f :: Sec H A -> Bool will produce the same result for arguments a1 and a2. See (Russo et al 2008a) for more details.…”

Section: The Sec Monadmentioning

confidence: 99%

A library for light-weight information-flow security in haskell

Russo

Claessen

Hughes

2008

Proceedings of the First ACM SIGPLAN Symposium on Haskell

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“…tainting user input to avoid SQL injection attacks. We represent information flow using well-established techniques, such as indexed monads [36] and applicative functors [38].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security-typed programming within dependently typed programming

MorgensternJamie

Licata

2010

SIGPLAN Not.

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Several recent security-typed programming languages, such as Aura, PCML5, and Fine, allow programmers to express and enforce access control and information flow policies. In this paper, we show that security-typed programming can be embedded as a library within a general-purpose dependently typed programming language, Agda. Our library, Aglet, accounts for the major features of existing security-typed programming languages, such as decentralized access control, typed proof-carrying authorization, ephemeral and dynamic policies, authentication, spatial distribution, and information flow. The implementation of Aglet consists of the following ingredients: First, we represent the syntax and proofs of an authorization logic, Garg and Pfenning's BL0, using dependent types. Second, we implement a proof search procedure, based on a focused sequent calculus, to ease the burden of constructing proofs. Third, we represent computations using a monad indexed by pre-and post-conditions drawn from the authorization logic, which permits ephemeral policies that change during execution. We describe the implementation of our library and illustrate its use on benchmark examples considered in the literature.

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“…Recent research has shown that a static approach to program validation through information flow control is the preferred, secure way to check programs. Dynamic techniques are not as effective because it is too difficult to check all the different paths that may come from a program and the side effect issues [18]. This is in line with our static Program Verifying Authority which checks the safety of programs before they are run.…”

Section: Related and Future Workmentioning

confidence: 84%

A case for validating remote application integrity for data processing systems

Chu

Montanari

Campbell

2012

2012 5th International Symposium on Resilient Control Systems

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There has been a great increase in recent years as to the amount of data from the grid that has been going to online systems. As more smart meters get installed into the AMI(advanced metering infrastructure), there is a need to mitigate the potential security threats in the collection system. There are a multitude of attack vectors that an adversary may take to compromise the confidentiality of user data and it may take much time and effort for developers to securely cover all such attack vectors. In this paper, we analyze the architecture of AMI systems and how data moves from one end to the other. In particular, we discuss the need for more research in safe program validation that protects against information leaks. Security problems can arise when programs do not perform as intended and may reveal confidential information or take unexpected actions. We discuss a theoretical network architecture that could take advantage of such secure program validation. The model minimizes attack vectors by containing data in one secure location that we call a DBPC(database processing center) instead of transporting data to multiple locations through a traditional DBMS(database management system). When outside parties want access to the data, they can send verified secure applications to the DBPC to run their applications remotely without direct access to the data. We describe the design of the AMI simulator and DBPC prototype module that we implemented.

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A library for light-weight information-flow security in haskell

Cited by 24 publications

References 26 publications

A library for light-weight information-flow security in haskell

A library for light-weight information-flow security in haskell

Security-typed programming within dependently typed programming

A case for validating remote application integrity for data processing systems

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