A Job Market Signaling Scheme for Incentive and Trust Management in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks

Abstract

International audienceIn collaborative wireless networks with a low infrastructure, the presence of misbehaving nodes can have a negative impact on network performance. In particular, we are interested in dealing with this nasty presence in road safety applications, based on vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). In this work, we consider as harmful the presence of malicious nodes, which spread false and forged data; and selfish nodes, which cooperate only for their own benefit. To deal with this, we propose a Distributed Trust Model (DTM2), adapted from the job market signaling model. DTM2 is based on allocating credits to nodes and securely managing these credits. To motivate selfish nodes to cooperate more, our solution establishes the cost of reception to access data, forcing them to earn credits. Moreover, to detect and exclude malicious nodes, DTM2 requires the cost of sending, using signaling values inspired form economics and based on the node's behavior, so that the more a node is malicious, the higher its sending cost, thus limiting their participation in the network. Similarly, rewards are given to nodes whose sent messages are considered as truthful, and that paid a sending cost considered as correct. The latter is a guarantee for the receivers about the truthfulness of the message since, in case of message refusal, the source node is not rewarded despite its payment. We validated DTM2 via a theoretical study using Markov chains; and with a set of simulations, in both urban and highway scenarios. Both theoretical and simulation results show that DTM2 excludes from the network 100% of malicious nodes, without causing any false positive detection. Moreover, our solution guarantees a good ratio of reception even in the presence of selfish nodes

Cyber security challenges and solutions for V2X communications: A survey

“…,Lei et al (2017),Wan et al (2016),Zhu et al (2017) AuthenticationChuang and Lee (2014),Yang et al (2017),Mamun et al (2014),Ying and Nayak (2017), Sun et al . (2012), Kerrache et al (2016b), Patel and Jhaveri (2015), Wei et al (2014), Abdelaziz et al (2014), Golle et al (2004), Yang (2013), Ding et al (2010a), Dixit et al (2016), Rostamzadeh et al (2015) Li et al (2013), Khan et al (2015), Shen et al (2013).Rewarding schemeHaddadou et al (2013),Haddadou et al (2015),Jesudoss et al et al (2010),Jahan and Suman (2016),Zhang et al (2016) Overview of the surveyed research works -Classified according to the security methods.…”

A blockchain‐based framework to secure vehicular social networks

“…The identity of SetId is the same as NodID. All VSN entities have an initial score for the Tm . Every VSN node has the following status: NodId; flag_color = white; SetId=NodId; miner_score is unavailable. …”

“…The reputation pattern is proposed to create a credible and honest link among selected nodes acting as miners. We apply the design discussed by Haddadou et al, in which the VSN entities are in possession of a hardware device proposed by the TPM group,() which is used in the works of Guette et al() and Wang et al Our proposed solution is semidistributed. The VSN entities intercommunicate with each other without passing by RSUs.…”

RITA: RIsk‐aware Trust‐based Architecture for collaborative multi‐hop vehicular communications

“…To deal with blackholes and the selective forwarding (greyholes) procedure, some hybrid trust models are also available . The first solution, proposed by Sedjelmaci et al is a two‐level intrusion detection system, the first one being based on a collaborative in‐cluster detection and the second one on a global detection processed by the RSU.…”

“…The work of Haddadou et al , called DTM 2 , proposes forcing nodes to be cooperative by establishing a communication cost. The latter is higher for selfish nodes, decreasing alongside with in‐network collaborativity.…”