A Jamming Game in Wireless Networks with Transmission Cost

Altman, Eitan; Avrachenkov, Konstantin; Garnaev, Andrey

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-72709-5_1

Cited by 105 publications

(90 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…LetT = 5. Then, by Theorem 2 as the first step we calculate ϕ t for t ∈ [1,5]. In our case we get (0, 0.14, 0.616, 1.830, 4.581).…”

Section: Numerical Examplesmentioning

confidence: 88%

“…In the previous works [3], [6], [14], it was suggested to find the Lagrange multiplier by means of a bisection algorithm, where comes the name "Water Filling Problem". Here we show that the Lagrange 1 The work was partly supported by RFBR and NNSF Grant no.06-01-39005 multiplier and hence the optimal solution of the water filling problem can be found in explicit form with a finite number of operations. In the multiuser context, one can view the problem in either cooperative or non-cooperative setting.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 91%

“…In the previous studies of the water-filling problems it was suggested to use numerical (e.g., bisection) method to solve the equation (1). Here we propose an explicit form approach for its solution.…”

Section: Single Decision Makermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…An interested reader can find more references on non-cooperative power control in [2], [8]. We would like to mention that the water filling problem and jamming games with transmission costs have been analyzed in [1].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Finally, we compare the non-cooperative approach with the cooperative approach and show that the non-cooperative approach results in a more fair resource distribution. 1 …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Closed Form Solutions for Symmetric Water Filling Games

Altman

Avrachenkov

Garnaev

2008

IEEE INFOCOM 2008 - The 27th Conference on Computer Communications

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Abstract-We study power control in optimization and game frameworks. In the optimization framework there is a single decision maker who assigns network resources and in the game framework users share the network resources according to Nash equilibrium. The solution of these problems is based on so-called water-filling technique, which in turn uses bisection method for solution of non-linear equations for Lagrange multipliers. Here we provide a closed form solution to the water-filling problem, which allows us to solve it in a finite number of operations. Also, we produce a closed form solution for the Nash equilibrium in symmetric Gaussian interference game with an arbitrary number of users. Even though the game is symmetric, there is an intrinsic hierarchical structure induced by the quantity of the resources available to the users. We use this hierarchical structure to perform a successive reduction of the game. In addition to its mathematical beauty, the explicit solution allows one to study limiting cases when the crosstalk coefficient is either small or large. We provide an alternative simple proof of the convergence of the Iterative Water Filling Algorithm. Furthermore, it turns out that the convergence of Iterative Water Filling Algorithm slows down when the crosstalk coefficient is large. Using the closed form solution, we can avoid this problem. Finally, we compare the non-cooperative approach with the cooperative approach and show that the non-cooperative approach results in a more fair resource distribution.

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“…LetT = 5. Then, by Theorem 2 as the first step we calculate ϕ t for t ∈ [1,5]. In our case we get (0, 0.14, 0.616, 1.830, 4.581).…”

Section: Numerical Examplesmentioning

confidence: 88%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 91%

Section: Single Decision Makermentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Finally, we compare the non-cooperative approach with the cooperative approach and show that the non-cooperative approach results in a more fair resource distribution. 1 …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Closed Form Solutions for Symmetric Water Filling Games

Altman

Avrachenkov

Garnaev

2008

IEEE INFOCOM 2008 - The 27th Conference on Computer Communications

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A game‐theoretic approach for ensuring trustworthiness in cyber‐physical systems with applications to multiloop UAV control

Jithish

Sankaran

2020

Trans Emerging Tel Tech

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Advancements in computing and communication technologies, coupled with the ubiquitous availability of low‐cost embedded devices, have enabled the vision of cyber‐physical systems (CPSs). With the advent of advanced persistent threats, CPSs are more vulnerable to sophisticated cyber‐attacks that cause catastrophic damages, thereby necessitating the development of novel defence architectures for CPS security. This work presents an analytical framework based on noncooperative game theory to evaluate the trustworthiness of individual nodes that constitute CPSs. The proposed approach uses the Nash equilibrium solution to derive a minimum trust threshold score for the CPS nodes. The game‐theoretic framework is evaluated on a supervisory control and data acquisition system prototype to model the evolution of the trust scores its sensors. Furthermore, we apply the model on a simulated unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) system and derive the trust threshold. The trust threshold represents the minimum trust score required to be maintained by individual UAV nodes. Nodes with trust scores below the threshold are potentially malicious and may be removed or isolated to ensure the secure operation of the system. The proposed approach is successfully implemented to detect malicious behavior in a simulated multiloop UAV control system with a fewer number of false‐positives, achieving a maximum accuracy of 98.85% across different scenarios.

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A cross‐layer game for energy‐efficient jamming detection in ad hoc networks

Thamilarasu

Sridhar

2011

Security Comm Networks

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The objective of jamming attacks in a network is to deny service to the communicating nodes, thus reducing network throughput and availability. In this paper, we propose a game theoretic framework for detecting jamming attacks in wireless ad hoc networks. We formulate jamming as a two‐player, non‐cooperative game to analyze the interaction between the attacker and the monitoring nodes in the network. We propose hybrid detection strategies at the monitor node by using cross‐layer features for attack detection. We solve the game by computing the mixed‐strategy Nash equilibrium and derive the optimal attack and detection strategies. Numerical results show that game theoretic analysis can be used to determine the optimal steady‐state monitoring strategies to provide higher detection accuracy, while balancing the monitoring energy costs. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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A Jamming Game in Wireless Networks with Transmission Cost

Cited by 105 publications

References 13 publications

Closed Form Solutions for Symmetric Water Filling Games

Closed Form Solutions for Symmetric Water Filling Games

A game‐theoretic approach for ensuring trustworthiness in cyber‐physical systems with applications to multiloop UAV control

A cross‐layer game for energy‐efficient jamming detection in ad hoc networks

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