A Influência Das Multas Fiscais Na Arrecadação Do Estado À Luz Da Teoria Da Utilidade Esperada E Da Concepção Da Curva De Laffer

Abstract

The proposal of this work is to verify the effect of the tax fine on the state revenue, following the model of Alligham and Sandmo (1972), however from the work of Sanyal, Gang and Goswami (2000). A model of state utility expected was proposed, based on the assumptions of Laffer's theory (2004), and then was tested the effect of the fine. It was concluded that the fine has no effect on state collection, if it does accepted the theory as constructed by Laffer. However, assuming that the so-called Laffer economic effect is a tax evasion effect, so that the taxpayer does not cease to generate income if the tax rate is 100%, but he will evade it, the model revealed that the fine has a leverage effect on the tax rate, so the state can use it to reduce the taxpayer's predisposition to evade when it raises it.