A Husserlian Account of the Affective Cognition of Value

Yaegashi, Toru

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-11893-8_6

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Scheler believes that an individual’s emotional intentions directly affect his or her judgment of value (Yoshikawa, 2019). Therefore, the first interview question is, “Why do you want to learn ICH?” Husserlian believes that emotional experience will affect the value cognition of individuals (Yaegashi, 2019). Therefore, the second question is, “How do you evaluate the ICH you are engaged in?” von Hildebrand (1916) believes that the value cognition of individuals come from the sense of value they have gained, so the third interview question is, “What you get from this job?” Aristotle believes that individuals’ value cognition of objects comes from their rational judgment (Hamalainen, 2015), so the fourth question is, “How do you think about the future of ICH?” The researchers took a one-to-one approach and conducted in-depth interviews with each interviewee on the above issues.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How is Intangible Cultural Heritage Valued in the Eyes of Inheritors? Scale Development and Validation

et al. 2020

Journal of Hospitality & Tourism Research

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Intangible cultural heritage (ICH) is an important part of human civilization and a major tourism resource type. In the ICH tourism development process, many stakeholders are involved. Although inheritors have a core position in this group, there is not enough research investigating the sustainable development of ICH tourism from the perspective of inheritors. Since value cognition is the basis that guides people’s behaviors, the value cognition of the ICH inheritors might be the starting point to understanding their behaviors. Considering this context, the main aim of this research is to describe the development and validation of a scale to assess the cognition values by ICH inheritors. By generating items, purifying, examining the scale’s dimensionality, and evaluating reliability and validity, a 25-item instrument is developed. The article concludes with a discussion of potential applications of the scale.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How is Intangible Cultural Heritage Valued in the Eyes of Inheritors? Scale Development and Validation

et al. 2020

Journal of Hospitality & Tourism Research

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“…C: There are two subclasses within the class of the "intentional feelings". 13 This conclusion leaves us with the following alternatives. According to the first, we are dealing with the same kind of intentional feeling, though each time it targets a different object (in P1 it targets evaluative properties, in P2 it targets affective states).…”

Section: The Heterogeneity Challengementioning

confidence: 99%

Feeling as Consciousness of Value

Ferran

2021

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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A vast range of our everyday experiences seem to involve an immediate consciousness of value. We hear the rudeness of someone making offensive comments. In seeing someone risking her life to save another, we recognize her bravery. When we witness a person shouting at an innocent child, we feel the unfairness of this action. If, in learning of a close friend’s success, envy arises in us, we experience our own emotional response as wrong. How are these values apprehended? The three most common answers provided by contemporary philosophy explain the consciousness of value in terms of judgment, emotion, or perception. An alternative view endorsed mainly by authors inspired by the phenomenological tradition argues that values are apprehended by an intentional feeling. In this model, it is by virtue of a feeling that objects are presented as being in different degrees and nuances fair or unfair, boring or funny, good or bad. This paper offers an account of this model of feeling and its basic features, and defends it over alternative models. To this end, the paper discusses different versions of the model circulating in current research which until now have developed in parallel rather than in mutual exchange. The paper also applies the proposed account to the moral domain and examines how a feeling of values is presupposed by several moral experiences.

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The Paradox of Axiological Coldness: An Original Husserlian Solution

Delamare

2023

Husserl Stud

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This paper explores the nature of our experiences of values – our valueceptions. In the recent literature, two main standpoints have emerged. On the one hand, the ‘Meinongian’ side claims that axiological properties are experienced exclusively in emotions. On the other hand, the ‘Hildebrandian’ side contends that since valueceptions can be ‘cold’, they are not accomplished in emotions but rather reside in ‘value-feelings’ – emotions, in this framework, being conceived of as reactions to the values thus revealed. The aim of the paper is to argue that the Husserlian phenomenology of affectivity, especially as it is developed during his Göttingen period, can help to overcome these two accounts. I start by pointing out that, contrary to what most scholars have assumed so far, Husserl’s theory of valueception is not tantamount to Meinong’s, as it is very sensitive to ‘Hildebrandian’ arguments (Part 2). The core of the paper is then devoted to a systematic reconstruction of Husserl’s solution to this controversy. Drawing on the analogy between thing-perceptions and value-perceptions (Part 3), I show, first, that ‘cold’ valueceptions are to be identified with empty apprehensions (Auffassungen) of value, in which an emotion is not actually experienced but is anticipated in such-and-such kinaesthetic circumstances (Part 4); second, that the realization of this anticipation amounts to the fulfillment of the valueception (Part 5). As a result, Husserl acknowledges the relevance of ‘value-feelings’, yet his account appears more satisfactory than traditional ‘Hildebrandian’ theories in that it demystifies these ‘value-feelings’ by reducing them to potential emotions.

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A Husserlian Account of the Affective Cognition of Value

Cited by 3 publications

References 8 publications

How is Intangible Cultural Heritage Valued in the Eyes of Inheritors? Scale Development and Validation

How is Intangible Cultural Heritage Valued in the Eyes of Inheritors? Scale Development and Validation

Feeling as Consciousness of Value

The Paradox of Axiological Coldness: An Original Husserlian Solution

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