A life without liberty and material resources is not a good life. Equally, a life devoid of meaningful social relationships-such as friendships, family attachments, and romances-is not a good life. From this it is tempting to conclude that just as individuals have rights to liberty and material resources, they also have rights to access meaningful social relationships. I argue that this conclusion can be defended only in a narrow set of cases. "Pure" social-relationship deprivation-i.e., deprivation that is not caused, or accompanied, by deficits in liberties and material resourcesmostly generates demands of private beneficence. I suggest that social-relationship deprivation is unjust, hence a rights-violation, only when it is due to factors-e.g., one's race-that are irrelevant to one's being a good participant in social relationships. I thus conclude that access to meaningful social relationships is not a fundamental concern for theories of (personal or political) justice. * I am grateful to Kimberley Brownlee, Chiara Cordelli, Anca Gheaus, and Christian List for very helpful written comments on an earlier draft of this paper.