Abstract:In this article, I derive a weak version of Kant's categorical imperative within an informal game-theoretic framework. More specifically, I argue that Hobbesian agents would choose what I call the weak principle of universalization, if they had to decide on a rule of conflict resolution in an idealized but empirically defensible hypothetical decision situation. The discussion clarifies (i) the rationality requirements imposed on agents, (ii) the empirical conditions assumed to warrant the conclusion, and (iii)… Show more
“…The history of the application of game theory to Hobbes' studies is long (Gauthier, : esp. 76 ff; Hampton, ; Kavka, ), and still ongoing (Eggers, ; Moehler, ), despite the vociferous criticism it has elicited (Neal, ; Ewin, ; Lloyd, ). I will not examine the entirety of this literature—much the less the broader ‘orthodox interpretation’ of Hobbes as the philosopher of self‐interested contractarianism (Gaus, )—which would be far too much for this paper, but only a small section of it: the discussion of the exit from the state of nature, and more specifically Hobbes' answer to the ‘foole’ (Hobbes, : XV.4–5; Zaitchik, ; Hampton, ; Kavka, ; Hoekstra, ).…”
Section: Game‐theoretical ‘Fooles’ and The Limits Of Consequentialismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Weaker game‐theoretical interpretations may be limited in their scope of application (Eggers, ) or introduce constraints to instrumental rationality (Moehler, ).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The discredit of the ‘Taylor–Warrender’ thesis probably contributed to obscure obvious similarities. Recent attempts to connect the two are unsatisfactory, as they don't grasp how deep the analogies run (Moehler, ). Notably, Kant had a direct knowledge of Hobbes' works (Gonnelli, ).…”
Starting from considering how radical Hobbes' rejection of teleology was, this paper presents a coherent reading of Hobbesian reason, as applied to the justification of political obligation, striking a more perspicuous third way between the ‘orthodox’ (based on self‐interest and consequentialism) and the ‘revisionist’ (moralizing, or variously substantive) readings. Both families of interpretations are partial to some elements of Hobbes' thought, therefore incapable of providing a coherent reading of its whole. A precise rendering of Hobbes' deontological reason allows a better hermeneutical understanding of his philosophy as well as a keener appreciation of its relevance for past and present political thought.
“…The history of the application of game theory to Hobbes' studies is long (Gauthier, : esp. 76 ff; Hampton, ; Kavka, ), and still ongoing (Eggers, ; Moehler, ), despite the vociferous criticism it has elicited (Neal, ; Ewin, ; Lloyd, ). I will not examine the entirety of this literature—much the less the broader ‘orthodox interpretation’ of Hobbes as the philosopher of self‐interested contractarianism (Gaus, )—which would be far too much for this paper, but only a small section of it: the discussion of the exit from the state of nature, and more specifically Hobbes' answer to the ‘foole’ (Hobbes, : XV.4–5; Zaitchik, ; Hampton, ; Kavka, ; Hoekstra, ).…”
Section: Game‐theoretical ‘Fooles’ and The Limits Of Consequentialismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Weaker game‐theoretical interpretations may be limited in their scope of application (Eggers, ) or introduce constraints to instrumental rationality (Moehler, ).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The discredit of the ‘Taylor–Warrender’ thesis probably contributed to obscure obvious similarities. Recent attempts to connect the two are unsatisfactory, as they don't grasp how deep the analogies run (Moehler, ). Notably, Kant had a direct knowledge of Hobbes' works (Gonnelli, ).…”
Starting from considering how radical Hobbes' rejection of teleology was, this paper presents a coherent reading of Hobbesian reason, as applied to the justification of political obligation, striking a more perspicuous third way between the ‘orthodox’ (based on self‐interest and consequentialism) and the ‘revisionist’ (moralizing, or variously substantive) readings. Both families of interpretations are partial to some elements of Hobbes' thought, therefore incapable of providing a coherent reading of its whole. A precise rendering of Hobbes' deontological reason allows a better hermeneutical understanding of his philosophy as well as a keener appreciation of its relevance for past and present political thought.
“…In previous work, I argue that, for the circumstances described, if rational agents decide on a principle of conflict resolution in an idealized but empirically defensible hypothetical decision situation, then they would agree with the ‘weak principle of universalization’: In cases of conflict, only pursue your interests subject to the side constraints that your opponents can (i) enter the process of conflict resolution at least from their minimum standards of living, if the goods that are in dispute permit it, and (ii) fulfill their interests above this level according to their relative bargaining power. (Moehler : 100)…”
Section: Deep Moral Pluralism and Distributive Justicementioning
confidence: 99%
“…In cases of conflict, only pursue your interests subject to the side constraints that your opponents can (i) enter the process of conflict resolution at least from their minimum standards of living, if the goods that are in dispute permit it, and (ii) fulfill their interests above this level according to their relative bargaining power. (Moehler : 100)…”
Section: Deep Moral Pluralism and Distributive Justicementioning
In this article, I defend a democratic form of the productivist welfare state. I argue that this form of the state can best cope, theoretically and practically, with the diversity of deeply morally pluralistic democratic societies for two reasons. First, the justification of this form of the state rests solely on general facts about human nature, basic human needs, and efficiency considerations in a world of moderately scarce resources. Second, this state does not aim to promote a specific view of justice, but human flourishing more generally, expressed in terms of individual and collective productivity. The proposed democratic productivist welfare state supports its citizens up to the level that allows them to develop and exercise their talents and abilities without providing incentives for free riding. I argue that, under the specific empirical circumstances that I describe, in particular certain informational restrictions concerning the precise productive and destructive capacities of the members of society in practice and the soundness of the Aristotelian principle, this goal may best be achieved in practice by the introduction of an unconditional basic income at subsistence level, if society is sufficiently developed economically to provide such an income. On productivist grounds, such an unconditional subsistence income also addresses, pragmatically and partially, the problem of historical injustices against the weakest members of society and provides all group members with the means for democratic participation.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
