A Highly Critical Moment: Role and Record of the 1907 Hague Peace Conference

Eyffinger, Arthur

doi:10.1017/s0165070x07001970

Cited by 21 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…This is precisely what Hague Convention XII and the London Declaration aimed to address. 25 The use of the submarine against merchant shipping during the First World War as a new destructive naval weapon and efforts to limit naval armament after the war pressed States to agree on a Protocol concerning the rules of submarine warfare in 1936. 26 This Protocol requires that "in their actions against merchant vessels submarine must conform to the same rules as surface vessels".…”

Section: Treaties and Naval Warfarementioning

confidence: 99%

The ever-existing “crisis” of the law of naval warfare

Fink¹

2022

Int. rev. Red Cross

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Although the subject of law of naval warfare was first in modern treatymaking in international humanitarian law (IHL), further treatymaking efforts that comprehensively deal with all matters of the law of naval warfare never really took off. This particular part of IHL has always been primarily governed by custom. Scholarly calls for revision have not pressed States into further treatymaking efforts, which gives the law of naval warfare a semblance of being continuously in a state of crisis. Conveniently for States, the San Remo Manual solved a significant portion of this crisis, but perhaps too successfully, as it may have taken away incentives for States to further develop the law. While the law of the sea has been steadily growing as a – codified – legal regime and protective rules of IHL garnered much attention, the law of naval warfare seems somewhat forgotten and crumbling in its details.

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Section: Treaties and Naval Warfarementioning

confidence: 99%

The ever-existing “crisis” of the law of naval warfare

Fink¹

2022

Int. rev. Red Cross

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“…The United States, Great Britain, and Germany likewise chose to bypass the court, referring the Samoa dispute for arbitration with the king of Sweden and Norway instead. Indeed, during the nearly eight-year interval between the first and second Hague conferences, only four arbitration cases were brought to the Hague (Eyffinger, 2007). Although some of its architects hoped the Hague system would replace traditional power politics, in practice the institutions of the Hague system were layered alongside familiar practices of great power diplomacy.…”

Section: The Hague System and The Roots Of The Liberal Ordermentioning

confidence: 99%

‘Most Potent and Irresistible Moral Influence’: Public Opinion, Rhetorical Coercion, and the Hague Conferences

MacDonald

2020

Global Policy

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International relations scholars debate whether the current liberal order can adapt to power shifts among the great powers. Yet historically, contestation among the great powers has often revolved around the question of whether the international system should be organized along liberal and institutional lines in the first place. In this paper, I examine great power negotiation strategies at the 1899 and 1907 Hague conferences, an often overlooked yet critical episode of liberal order-building. As rising powers shuffled the great power ranks, many hoped that the Hague conferences would prevent arms racing, reduce the barbarity of war, and promote peaceful solutions to international crises. Champions of liberal rules and institutions used principled persuasion, appealing to shared norms and collective identities. They also engaged in rhetorical coercion, seeking at times to shame potential obstructionists. Yet the conferences revealed the profound limitations of these soft-power based negotiation strategies. For a brief moment in 1899, circumstances allowed champions of the Hague system to persuade states to sign on to the laws of war and to embarrass states into accepting arbitration. Yet by 1907, conditions had changed and obstructionists were able to mobilize broad coalitions to block significant change. The Hague conferences highlight the importance of interstate coalitional networks in institutional adaptation. Policy Implications • States seeking institutional adaptation should use principled persuasion when preferences are relatively aligned and there is a strong normative consensus in favor of reform. • States seeking institutional adaptation should use rhetorical coercion when they are not acting in an obviously hypocritical manner and the target has clearly violated a widely shared normative principle.

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“…Their attendance at the 1907 Conference was motivated by selfinterest, as each sought to maximise the freedom of their navy and the protection of their commerce. 50 Similarly, the US wanted to increase its legitimacy over Latin America and reinforce the Monroe Doctrine vis-à-vis the Europeans. One of the most prominent US delegates at The Hague Conference in 1907, J. Choate mentioned the necessity for the US to have a strong navy at that time to defend the Monroe Doctrine and control the Panama Canal.…”

Section: A Utopian Gatheringmentioning

confidence: 99%

The 1907 Hague Peace Conference: Understanding China’s Initial Steps towards the ‘International Society’

Lizé¹

2020

China & WTO Rev.

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A Highly Critical Moment: Role and Record of the 1907 Hague Peace Conference

Cited by 21 publications

References 1 publication

The ever-existing “crisis” of the law of naval warfare

The ever-existing “crisis” of the law of naval warfare

‘Most Potent and Irresistible Moral Influence’: Public Opinion, Rhetorical Coercion, and the Hague Conferences

The 1907 Hague Peace Conference: Understanding China’s Initial Steps towards the ‘International Society’

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