A hierarchical spatial game over licenced resources

Abstract

Abstract-We consider a scenario in which a regulator owns the spectrum in a region. Two service providers lease spectrum from the regulator and set up a base station each to serve mobile subscribers. This leads to a hierarchical game with players at two levels-the mobile subscribers at level 1 and the service providers at level 2. In the game at level 1, each mobile subscriber chooses a service provider to subscribe to and whether to be a primary subscriber of its service provider and receive high-priority service or to be a secondary subscriber and receive low-priority service. In the game at level 2, each service provider chooses the quantity of spectrum to lease from the regulator and the rates at which to charge its mobile subscribers for the throughput they receive. We first analyze the game at level 1 for different models and in each case show the existence of a threshold-type Wardrop equilibrium, in which there exist thresholds that divide the region into sets of mobile subscribers that make the same decision at equilibrium. Next, assuming that the mobile subscribers act so as to give rise to the equilibrium found above, we analyze the game at level 2 and show the existence of a Nash equilibrium.

Wi-Fi 2.0: Price and quality competitions of duopoly cognitive radio wireless service providers with time-varying spectrum availability

“…First, we model the interaction between WSPs as a joint game with price and quality competitions while accounting for time-varying spectrum availability. The existing game-theoretic approaches to the dynamic spectrum market [12]- [14] have been limited to static idle channels, and to the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to incorporate the effect of time-varying channel availability in the game-theoretic framework. Next, we model the market dynamics as a Markov chain, and derive the Nash Equilibria (NE) of the price and quality games and the market entry barrier for each WSP.…”

“…However, they assumed that the spectrum leasing cost is constant and does not depend on the total demand in the spectrum auction. Kasbekar et al [14] considered a hierarchical game of quantity-price competition, with a two-level prioritized service available to the end-users, and Kasberkar and Sarkar [15] analyzed the case where the availability of licensed channels is determined with some probability while no channel-state transition occurs during a lease term. None of the above work, however, considered time-varying spectrum availability, while assuming that a leased channel is always idle during a leasing term.…”

Hierarchical Market Competition in a Duopoly Super Wi-Fi Spectrum Market

“…Zhu et al [14] introduced a hierarchical spectrum market with spectrum brokers and secondary service providers, where dynamic spectrum leasing and service selection are investigated. Kasbekar et al [18] considered a hierarchical game between two spectrum market layers, and analyzed the interaction between the regulator, service providers and mobile subscribers.…”

Hybrid risk-sensitive mean-field stochastic differential games with application to molecular biology

“…In [5], large population minority games are studied from a statistical mechanics viewpoint in the context of financial markets. In [6], mobile subscribers are modeled as a continuum, and it is shown that a thresholdtype Wardrop equilibrium exists as a result of competitions for users between two base stations. In [10], the concept of oblivious equilibrium is proposed for the analysis of a class of large-scale stochastic games.…”