2015
DOI: 10.3998/ergo.12405314.0002.017
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

A Harm-Based Solution to the Non-Identity Problem

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
32
0

Year Published

2015
2015
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
6
1

Relationship

0
7

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 23 publications
(37 citation statements)
references
References 6 publications
0
32
0
Order By: Relevance
“…It is natural to think that we could find a more plausible theory by focusing on the causal, rather than the merely counterfactual, connections that obtain between an event and an agent's well-being level. However, while such causal theories of harm are popular (see, for example, Harman [2009], Thomson [2011], Gardner [2015], and Purves [2019]), we think that this approach fails too, for reasons that we discuss elsewhere [manuscript]. In our view, there is another possibility that at least deserves serious consideration-namely, that no neat and informative theory of harm is true.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 93%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…It is natural to think that we could find a more plausible theory by focusing on the causal, rather than the merely counterfactual, connections that obtain between an event and an agent's well-being level. However, while such causal theories of harm are popular (see, for example, Harman [2009], Thomson [2011], Gardner [2015], and Purves [2019]), we think that this approach fails too, for reasons that we discuss elsewhere [manuscript]. In our view, there is another possibility that at least deserves serious consideration-namely, that no neat and informative theory of harm is true.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 93%
“…It is still worth including this clause, as it makes Adequacy Condition 2, as well as our arguments below, even more difficult to resist. That there are 'no other relevant differences' between a and a* is here stipulated to mean that a and a* do not differ with regard to factors such as causation, rights-violations, the agent's motives or intentions, or other factors that opponents of well-being counterfactualist accounts have sometimes held to be relevant to harm and benefit (see, for example, Woodward [1986], Harman [2009], Gardner [2015], and Purves [2019]). Without this ceteris paribus clause, Adequacy Condition 2 might be rejected (although not by well-being counterfactualists) on, for instance, the ground that, even if W Sa is much higher than W Sa* and a* would not harm S, it can still be true that a would harm S so long as a but not a* would cause S to occupy the relevant well-being level.…”
Section: The Counterfactual Comparative Accountmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Instead, proponents of the Will-focused view need to provide some sufficient condition on an action's harming someone, which is satisfied by Wilma's action and Will, respectively. Again, the focus here will be on Molly Gardner's recent proposal (Gardner 2015a;see also 2015c, 2016, 2017a, but our discussion of it will eventually reveal a much more general problem for the Will-focused view.…”
Section: Harming the Actual Child: The Will-focused Viewmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…There are, however, also various other strategies in the literature. Perhaps the most popular of these is the harm-based approach (e.g., Algander 2013;Bontly 2016;Gardner 2015a;Harman 2004Harman , 2009Shiffrin 1999). On this view, Wilma's action is harmful after all, and it is largely for this reason that her action is morally objectionable.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Now, the discussion about the non-identity problem has prevailed for a long time and a consensus has not been reached. Several philosophers aim to solve this paradox in different ways, either by arguing that there are reasons against any harm and reasons in favour of any benefit, those are views based on a harm-based account (Harman, 2004;Gardner, 2015); or by suggesting that there is not a problem at all and that we should accept the conclusion of the non-identity problem merely as an argument (Heyd, 2009;Boonin, 2014). However, irrespective of this on-going debate, I want to stress that the non-identity problem is not a problem that concerns me directly, because my proposal intends to elucidate that our way to achieve the best moral outcome regarding the future, cannot be achieved by conceptualizing into the future.…”
Section: The Non-identity Problemmentioning
confidence: 99%