A Hard‐line Reply to Pereboom’s Four‐Case Manipulation Argument<sup>1</sup>

McKenna, Michael

doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00179.x

Cited by 121 publications

(61 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Moral responsibility depends entirely on what happens in 14 The BManipulation Argument^suggests that if I am manipulated by an external agent to perform a given action, I am not morally responsible for this action even if I am unaware of the manipulation and therefore fully believe that I performed the action entirely on my own. For different versions of, and responses to, the Manipulation Argument, see Campbell (2011, 66-69);Fischer (2004) ;Fischer & Ravizza (1998, 196-201, 230-239); Kane (1996, 64-71); Levy (2011, 85-89, 105-106), McKenna (2008b); Mele (1995Mele ( , 187-191, 2006Mele ( , 138-144, 164-195, 2008; Pereboom (2001, 110-122). 15 See Frankfurt (1969Frankfurt ( , 1971Frankfurt ( , 78-79, 1975.…”

Section: Frankfurt's Argument Against Papmentioning

confidence: 98%

Blocking Blockage

Levy

2016

Philosophia

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The Blockage Argument is designed to improve upon Harry Frankfurt's famous argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) by removing the counterfactual intervener altogether. If the argument worked, then it would prove in a way that Frankfurt's argument does not that moral responsibility does not require any alternative possibilities whatsoever, not even the weakest Bflicker of freedom^(such as the possibility of avoiding voluntary action). Some philosophers have rejected the Blockage Argument solely on the basis of their intuition that the inability to do otherwise is incompatible with moral responsibility. I will argue, however, that it is not merely the inability to do otherwise by itself but rather the inability to do otherwise in combination with the absence of a counterfactual intervener that is incompatible with moral responsibility. If I cannot do otherwise and it is not because of a counterfactual intervener, then it must be the case that I am being forced to choose and therefore act as I do, in which case I cannot be morally responsible for this action. Because the Blockage Argument fails, and because it was really the only way to establish that moral responsibility does not require any alternative possibilities whatsoever, it follows that moral responsibility does indeed require at least one alternative possibility in any given situation. But it turns out that this conclusion does not tip the balance in favor of incompatibilism over compatibilism. It would have if blockage and determinism were equivalent. But they are not. Unlike blockage, determinism is compatible with certain counterfactuals that compatibilists traditionally believed the ability to do otherwise reduces to. So even though moral responsibility is incompatible with blockage, it does not necessarily follow that moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism.Keywords Moral responsibility . Harry Frankfurt . Principle of alternative possibilities . Blockage argument . John Martin Fischer . Flicker-of-freedom strategy . Ability to do otherwise . Alternative possibilities . Determinism . Indeterminism . Compatibilism . Incompatibilism

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Section: Frankfurt's Argument Against Papmentioning

confidence: 98%

Blocking Blockage

Levy

2016

Philosophia

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“…In contrast to a soft-line reply, a proponent of the aptly named hard-line reply bites the bullet and rejects premise (1) (McKenna 2008). In other words, despite initial appearances, Plum 1 is blameworthy for his decision to kill White.…”

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confidence: 89%

The Manipulation Argument, At the Very Least, Undermines Classical Compatibilism

Cohen

2015

Philosophia

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The compatibility of determinism and the ability to do otherwise has been implicitly assumed by many to be irrelevant to the viability of compatibilist responses to the manipulation argument for incompatibilism. I argue that this assumption is mistaken. The manipulation argument may be unsound. But even so, the manipulation argument, at the very least, undermines classical compatibilism, the view that free will requires the ability to do otherwise, and having that ability is compatible with determinism. This is because classical compatibilism, in conjunction with any type of reply to the manipulation argument, has counterintuitive implications. In order to avoid such implications, we need not hold that determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility. But we must hold that determinism is incompatible with the ability to do otherwise.

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“…As compatibilists like McKenna (2008;2014) have argued, the best response to the Manipulation Argument as regards responsibility is, in the end, likely to be a hard-line one.…”

Section: Manipulation: Natural and Supernaturalmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Indeed, various important considerations may be marshalled in support of Manipulation* with respect to responsibility (see, for instance, Double 1991;Frankfurt 2002;Berofksy 2006;McKenna 2008;2013;2014). Yet many compatibilists concede that, even when cast in its best light, Manipulation* retains a lingering implausibility that such considerations are unlikely ever to fully expunge (McKenna 2014;c.f.…”

Section: Manipulation: Natural and Supernaturalmentioning

confidence: 99%

VI-Freedom and Indoctrination

Garnett

2015

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)

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It has been alleged that compatibilists are committed to the view that agents act freely and responsibly even when subject to certain forms of radical manipulation. In this paper I identify and elucidate a form of compatibilist freedom, social autonomy, that is essential to understanding what is wrong with ordinary indoctrination and argue that it also holds the key to understanding what goes wrong in more fanciful manipulation cases. I. THE MANIPULATION ARGUMENTImagine a causally predetermined action that meets all of the standard compatibilist requirements on freedom and responsibility, such as relevant knowledge, reasonsresponsiveness, higher-order endorsement, non-coercion, and so on. Then suppose that the distant causal chains inevitably leading to this action's performance were in fact initiated by some sinister manipulator. Since this further supposition is not precluded by any of the standard compatibilist requirements, the compatibilist looks committed to the implausible view that agents insidiously controlled by unwelcome manipulators may nevertheless be paragons of freedom and responsibility. Moreover, the root source of the compatibilist's problem seems to be her very claim that freedom and responsibility are compatible with determinism. For this is, after all, just the claim that freedom and responsibility are compatible with 'manipulation' by natural forces-and once it is allowed that agents may be free and responsible despite being no more than marionettes, what can it matter who or what is pulling the strings? This is the incompatibilist's Manipulation Argument (Kane 1985, Ch. 3; 1996, Ch. 5;Kapitan 2000; Pereboom 2001, pp. 110-26; Mele 1995, pp. 190-1; 2006, pp. 188-90). Alfred Mele motivates one version of it with a widely-discussed case in which a 'supremely intelligent being', Diana, creates a zygote in a woman, Mary. Diana combines [the zygote] Z's atoms as she does because she wants a certain event E to occur thirty years later. From her knowledge of the state of the universe just prior to her creating Z and the laws of nature of her deterministic universe, she deduces that a zygote with precisely Z's constitution located in Mary will develop into an ideally self-controlled agent [Ernie] 2 who, in thirty years, will judge, on the basis of rational deliberation, that it is best to A and will A on the basis of that judgement, thereby bringing about E. (2006, p. 188) Many are reluctant to concede that, when Ernie As, he does so with full freedom and moral responsibility. Yet this is precisely the claim to which the compatibilist seems unavoidably committed.Although the Manipulation Argument is generally taken to target compatibilist accounts of both freedom and responsibility, to date the focus has mostly been on the latter (indeed, the reference to freedom is frequently redundant, insofar as it is restricted to freedom 'in the sense required for moral responsibility'). Yet the argument also poses a formidable challenge to compatibilist attempts to understand human freedom in its own rig...

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A Hard‐line Reply to Pereboom’s Four‐Case Manipulation Argument¹

Cited by 121 publications

References 18 publications

Blocking Blockage

Blocking Blockage

The Manipulation Argument, At the Very Least, Undermines Classical Compatibilism

VI-Freedom and Indoctrination

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A Hard‐line Reply to Pereboom’s Four‐Case Manipulation Argument1

Cited by 121 publications

References 18 publications

Blocking Blockage

Blocking Blockage

The Manipulation Argument, At the Very Least, Undermines Classical Compatibilism

VI-Freedom and Indoctrination

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A Hard‐line Reply to Pereboom’s Four‐Case Manipulation Argument¹