Conditions exist in carbon dioxide (CO 2) gas-cooled, graphite moderated reactors that might allow for gaseous transport of uranium oxide (UO 2) particles into the graphite moderator. The transport of UO 2 in the reactor coolant system, and subsequent deposition of this material in the graphite, is of interest due to the potential to influence the application of the Graphite Isotope Ratio Method (GIRM). GIRM was developed to validate the declared operation of graphite moderated reactors. Uranium impurities in nuclear grade graphite are one of several possible indicator elements that can be used for a GIRM assessment. During fuel failures, uranium metal in the fuel is exposed to the CO 2 coolant and oxidizes as either UO 2 or U 3 O 8. Measurements in adjacent fuel channels indicate that CO 2 coolant readily flows through the porous graphite moderator blocks. Therefore, the potential exists for the coolant gas to transport UO 2 particles, as an aerosol, into the porous graphite, thereby invalidating uranium as an indicator element. Scoping calculations indicated that a mass of UO 2 particles sufficient to impact typical background levels in the graphite could be produced during the life of a graphite reactor. Air flow velocities in these reactors were more than sufficient to transport UO 2 particles to channels adjacent to where the fuel failure occurred. The objective of the work, summarized in this report, was to address the feasibility and extent of UO 2 particle transport in porous graphite. Using a theoretical model, based on classical aerosol filtration, a conservative, worst-case, particle size distribution (PSD) was determined. Experiments were then designed to evaluate the aerosol flow, using the worst case PSD, through well-characterized porous graphite samples. The graphite samples were analyzed to determine the UO 2 concentration profile and quantify the depth of penetration. The experimental results were also compared to model data to further understand the physics of UO 2 aerosol flow in porous graphite. The graphite penetration tests indicate that it is possible for uranium from fuel failures to be transported by the CO 2 gas coolant system and be deposited at depths as great as 35 mm in the graphite blocks of a graphite moderated reactor. Since a nominal GIRM graphite sample is taken within the first 19 mm, uranium from fuel failures has the potential to adversely impact a GIRM assessment. The penetration of uranium seen in these worst case tests may not be realized when UO 2 is generated from fuel failures in an actual reactor environment. Nonetheless, these tests show that steps must be taken to identify and ensure that uranium contamination from fuel failures does not adversely impact a GIRM assessment. A standard protocol to evaluate whether a GIRM graphite sample has been compromised by uranium from fuel failures should be implemented and appropriate steps should be taken to ensure that any compromised sample uses other indicator elements for GIRM assessment.