A gradual reformation: empirical character and causal powers in Kant

Abstract

According to Kant each person has an empirical character, which is ultimately grounded in one’s free choice. The popular Causal Laws interpretation of empirical character holds that it consists of the causal laws governing our psychology. I argue that this reading has difficulties explaining moral change, the ‘gradual reformation’ of our empirical character: Causal laws cannot change and hence cannot be gradually reformed. I propose an alternative Causal Powers interpretation of empirical character, where our empirical character consists of our mind’s causal powers. The resulting picture of empirical character allows for moral change and Kantian weakness of will.

Every man has his price: Kant's argument for universal radical evil

“…Causal laws and causal powers of nature are on a different ontological level from states and events: the causal grounds that, given prior states of affairs, determine the subsequent states of affairs need not themselves be empirically determined. See further Indregard (2018).…”

Consciousness as Inner Sensation: Crusius and Kant

“…54. See Indregard (2017a) for an account of how mental powers figure in Kant's theory of empirical character. that the intensive magnitude of empirical consciousness is not reducible to the intensive magnitude of outer sensations.…”

Timeless Freedom in Kant

“…Despite its importance, this issue has received relatively little attention recently; notable exceptions include Freyenhagen (2008), Greenberg (2019), Herman (2018: 220-21), Insole (2011), Michel (2014), Walker (2017), 3 There is an additional problem that I do not discuss here, namely whether Kant's locating transcendental freedom outside of time allows for moral change. See Pereboom (2006: 556-7n33) for a succinct version of this challenge, and Indregard (2018) for a recent attempt to defend Kant on this. See also Insole (2013: 121-134) for an illuminating account of how Kant came to his position on this issue, and the relationship of Kant's views to the Augustinian tradition.…”