A Geometric Approach to Fair Division

Barbanel, Julius B.

doi:10.4169/074683410x510263

Cited by 2 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…The auction implements utilitarian division, which is defined as the allocation of goods to the buyers that value them the most, and is considered as one of the fairness criteria for resource allocation [49]. Additionally, the pricing of DER services is uniform to all consumers and is demandindependent.…”

Section: ) Fairnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Combinatorial Double Auction for Community Shared Distributed Energy Resources

2023

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The integration of distributed energy resources (DERs), such as renewable energy (RE) and energy storage systems, can have many environmental and economic benefits. The sharing of medium-scale DERs can enhance these benefits by ensuring efficient resource utilisation and can promote sharing economy and economies of scale opportunities. In this paper, we design a combinatorial double auction (CDA) for DER sharing between multiple DER providers and a community of consumers. The proposed DER market addresses the complementarity of DER services and supports the environmentally sustainable behaviour of consumers. The purpose of the proposed auction is to allocate the limited DER resources efficiently without compromising the privacy or the comfort of consumers. First, the combinatorial bidding rules are designed and the social welfare optimisation problem is formulated. Then, utility maximising strategies for consumers with both economic and environmental objectives are proposed. Additionally, three types of DER providers are introduced, and their revenue maximising strategies are investigated. A case study with real world RE

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Section: ) Fairnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Combinatorial Double Auction for Community Shared Distributed Energy Resources

2023

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“…This work aims to design a market mechanism that allocates vaccines among countries fairly. The literature on fair division of limited resources investigates four allocation mechanisms [ 39 ]. Assuming that there are N number of agents (i.e.…”

Section: Problem Statementmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…utilitarian division). Proportional and envy-free division are mostly applicable to heterogeneous goods [ 39 ], while egalitarian division often leads to inefficient outcomes [ 41 ]. Nonetheless, calculating the optimal allocations from Eq 9 requires knowledge of the individual characteristics of all agents .…”

Section: Problem Statementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mechanism design for a fair and equitable approach to global vaccine distribution: The case of COVID-19

Abedrabboh,

Al-Majid,

Al-Fagih

et al. 2023

PLOS Glob Public Health

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Vaccines are one of the most effective tools humanity has in the fight against pandemics. One of the major challenges of vaccine distribution is achieving fair and equitable allocation across the countries of the world, regardless of their economic wealth. The self-interested behaviour of high-income countries and the underutilisation of vaccines allocated to underprepared countries are some of the failures reported during COVID-19 vaccine roll-out. These shortcomings have motivated the need for a central market mechanism that takes into account the countries’ vulnerability to COVID-19 and their readiness to distribute and administer their allocated vaccines. In this paper, we leverage game theory to study the problem of equitable global vaccine distribution and propose a fair market mechanism that aligns self-interested behaviour with optimal global objectives. First, we model the interaction between a central vaccine provider (e.g. COVAX) and a country reporting its demand as a two-player game, and discuss the Nash and mixed Nash equilibria of that game. Then, we propose a repeated auction mechanism with an artificial payment system for allocating vaccines among participating countries, where each auction round is based on a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. The proposed allocation mechanism aims at minimising deaths and incentivises the self-interested countries to report their demand truthfully. Compared with real-world COVAX allocation decisions, our results show that the proposed auction mechanism achieves more efficient outcomes that maximise the number of averted deaths. Pragmatic considerations are investigated and policy recommendations are discussed.

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A Geometric Approach to Fair Division

Cited by 2 publications

References 15 publications

A Combinatorial Double Auction for Community Shared Distributed Energy Resources

A Combinatorial Double Auction for Community Shared Distributed Energy Resources

Mechanism design for a fair and equitable approach to global vaccine distribution: The case of COVID-19

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