Are economic agents successful optimizers? An analysis through service strategy in tennis Klaassen, F.J.G.M.; Magnus, J.R.
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Download date: 11 May 2018Are economic agents successful optimizers? An analysis through service strategy in tennis Abstract: We consider the question whether top tennis players in a top tournament (Wimbledon) employ an optimal (efficient) service strategy. We show that top players do not, in general, follow an optimal strategy. The estimated inefficiencies are not large: the inefficiency regarding winning a point on service is on average 1.1% for men and 2.0% for women. Thus, by adopting an efficient service strategy, players can (on average) increase the probability of winning a match by 2.4% for men and 3.2% for women. We use these findings to shed some light on the question whether economic agents are successful optimizers.