A General Theory of Domination and Justice

Abstract

In all societies, past and present, many persons and groups have been subject to domination. Properly understood, domination is a great evil, the suffering of which ought to be minimized as far as possible. Surprisingly, however, political and social theorists have failed to provide a detailed analysis of the concept of domination in general. This study aims to redress this lacuna. It argues first that domination should be understood as a condition experienced by persons or groups to the extent that they are dependent on a social relationship in which some other person or group wields arbitrary power over them; this is termed the “arbitrary power conception” of domination. Second, it argues that we should regard it as wrong to perpetrate or permit unnecessary domination and, thus, that as a matter of justice the political and social institutions and practices of any society should be organized so as to minimize avoidable domination; this is termed “justice as minimizing domination (JMD),” a conception of social justice that connects with more familiar civic republican accounts of freedom as nondomination. In developing these arguments, this study employs a variety of methodological techniques — including conceptual analysis, formal modeling, social theory, and moral philosophy; existing accounts of dependency, power, social convention, and so on are clarified, expanded, or revised along the way. While of special interest to contemporary civic republicans, this study should appeal to a broad audience with diverse methodological and substantive interests.

Indiscriminate mass surveillance and the public sphere

“…According to these authors, what privacy protects us from is not interference but domination. Someone is dominated whenever there is someone else who has the option of arbitrarily interfering with their choices, whether this option is taken or not (Lovett 2010;Pettit 1997). Therefore, it does not matter that the information that is gathered by indiscriminate mass surveillance is, in fact, not abused (Skinner 2015).…”

Two spheres of domination: Republican theory, social norms and the insufficiency of negative freedom

“…See also Skinner 1998). iii Notable recent accounts include Lovett 2010, Laborde 2008, Maynor 2003, and Viroli 2002. See also the contributions to volumes edited by Laborde and Maynor (2008) and Besson and Martí (2009).…”

Toleration and Non-Domination

“…On the one hand, it seems to be a matter of acting according to a personal whim -rather than the consistent rule of law, for example. On the other hand, the arbitrariness sometimes is defined as a matter of acting without regard for the interests of those affected -rather than 'tracking' their interests (Pettit, 1997: 55 This conception of domination has been refined and given more extensive analysis by Frank Lovett (Lovett 2010a). 16 He defines domination more precisely as follows:…”