A general strategy proof fair allocation mechanism

Sun, Ning; Yang, Zaifu

doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(03)00151-4

Cited by 40 publications

(41 citation statements)

References 7 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…One of the extensively studied problems not referenced above is the one of fair (envyfree) allocation (Svensson 1983, Maskin 1987, Alkan et al 1991, Tadenuma and Thomson 1991. 22 In the context of strategy-proofness, fair allocation rules are investigated by Tadenuma and Thomson (1995), Sun and Yang (2003), Ohseto (2006), and Svensson (2004Svensson ( , 2009. 23 When Svensson (2004Svensson ( , 2009) characterizes the class of strategy-proof and envy-free rules, he does not impose no subsidy for losers on rules, but imposes only the nonnegativity of the sum of payments-the requirement that the sum of the agents' payments be nonnegative.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency with Nonquasi-Linear Preferences: A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule

Morimoto

Serizawa

2012

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We consider the problem of allocating objects to a group of agents and how much agents should pay. Each agent receives at most one object and has nonquasi-linear preferences. Non-quasi-linear preferences describe environments where payments influence agents' abilities to utilize objects or derive benefits from them. The minimum price Walrasian (MPW) rule is the rule that assigns a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium allocation to each preference profile. We establish that the MPW rule is the unique rule satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency, individual rationality, and no subsidy for losers. Since the outcome of the MPW rule coincides with that of the simultaneous ascending (SA) auction, our result supports SA auctions adopted by many governments. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

show abstract

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency with Nonquasi-Linear Preferences: A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule

Morimoto

Serizawa

2012

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Here, envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, and budget balancedness are not compatible (Alkan et al, 1991;Tadenuma and Thomson, 1995). However, this incompatibility does not hold in the domain where the monetary transfers cannot exceed some exogenously given upper bound for each good (Sun and Yang, 2003;Andersson and Svensson, 2008a;Svensson, 2009). For instance, the "optimal fair rules" are envy-free and strategy-proof (Sun and Yang, 2003).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, this incompatibility does not hold in the domain where the monetary transfers cannot exceed some exogenously given upper bound for each good (Sun and Yang, 2003;Andersson and Svensson, 2008a;Svensson, 2009). For instance, the "optimal fair rules" are envy-free and strategy-proof (Sun and Yang, 2003). 2 Moreover, they are characterized by envy-freeness, a regularity condition, and group strategy-proofness, i.e., no group of agents benefits from misrepresenting their valuations (Andersson and Svensson, 2008a;Svensson, 2009).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint

2014

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.

show abstract

“…This impossibility result is not true in the model where an agent can receive the object and a (positive or negative) monetary transfer that cannot exceed some exogenously given upper bound (Sun and Yang, 2003;Ohseto, 2006;Svensson, 2009). In our model, the exogenous upper bound would be V g .…”

Section: Government Budget Constraintmentioning

confidence: 99%

Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint

2012

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

A general strategy proof fair allocation mechanism

Cited by 40 publications

References 7 publications

Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency with Nonquasi-Linear Preferences: A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule

Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency with Nonquasi-Linear Preferences: A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule

Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint

Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About