A general framework for measuring VAT compliance rates

Giesecke, James; Tran, Nhi

doi:10.1080/00036846.2011.554382

Cited by 18 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Building on Giesecke and Tran (, ), our GST system models: multiple legislated tax rates across commodities; different legislated GST exemption statuses across commodities; different legislated capacities to reclaim GST on inputs to production and investment; different rates of registration for GST purposes; export taxation via application of GST on domestic purchases by non‐residents; and potential for incomplete GST collections due to non‐compliance. We also require the GST system to carry sufficient detail to be embedded in a multi‐regional model.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Giesecke and Tran () account for multi‐production, differentiated degrees of exemption by commodity and user, and industry‐specific differences in capacities to reclaim VAT paid on production inputs. Giesecke and Tran () developed this system further, including differentiated VAT registration rates, undeclared imports, unclaimed tax on tourist spending, and general and transaction‐specific compliance rates. Giesecke and Tran () used their model to examine VAT compliance rates, but outside a wider CGE system.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Giesecke and Tran () developed this system further, including differentiated VAT registration rates, undeclared imports, unclaimed tax on tourist spending, and general and transaction‐specific compliance rates. Giesecke and Tran () used their model to examine VAT compliance rates, but outside a wider CGE system.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this paper, we extend the Giesecke and Tran () system by adding regional detail. We then embed the system within a multi‐regional CGE model of Australia.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

The National and Regional Consequences of Australia's Goods and Services Tax

Giesecke

Tran

2018

Economic Record

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The major political parties support the tenet of the original GST agreement that GST change requires unanimous state approval. However, GST change could differentially affect state economies, and thus influence support from individual states. We investigate the potential for GST change to differentially affect state economies. We do this by developing a multi-regional model of the Australian economy that contains details of the legislated features of the GST. In this model, when we change any element of the GST, the economic effects are informed by regional differences in economic structure and their interactions with the details of our GST theory.JEL classifications: C68, H25, H73, R13, D57

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Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this paper, we extend the Giesecke and Tran () system by adding regional detail. We then embed the system within a multi‐regional CGE model of Australia.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The National and Regional Consequences of Australia's Goods and Services Tax

Giesecke

Tran

2018

Economic Record

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“…For VAT, finally, the choice is particularly difficult, and there exists a large literature dealing with this topic (see e.g. Giesecke and Tran, 2012;Ginebri et al, 2005;Schaffer and Turley, 2000). We use one of the proxies suggested by the literature and reported by the Russian statistical authoritiesthe final consumption.…”

Section: Composition Of Tax Arrearsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Tax Collection and Fiscal Decentralization: The Case of Russia

Libman

Feld

2013

German Economic Review

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In a centralized federation, where tax rates and taxation rules are set by the federal government, manipulating the thoroughness of tax auditing and the effectiveness of tax collection could be attractive for regional authorities because of a variety of reasons. These range from tax competition to principal-agent problems, state capture and benefits of fiscal equalization. In this paper we discuss strategic tax auditing and collection from the perspective of fiscal federalism and test for strategic tax collection empirically using data of the Russian Federation. Russia's regional authorities in the 1990s have always been suspect of tax auditing manipulations in their favor. However, in the 2000s increasing bargaining power of the centre seems to induce tax collection bodies in the regions to manipulate tax auditing in favor of the federal centre. Our findings confirm the existence of strategic tax collection for the Yeltsin period after exclusion of outliers; the results for the Putin period are however rather ambiguous.JEL Codes: H26, H77

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Does VAT have higher tax compliance than a turnover tax? Evidence from China

Wang

2019

Int Tax Public Finance

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A general framework for measuring VAT compliance rates

Abstract: The Centre of Policy Studies (COPS) is a research centre at Monash University devoted to economy-wide modelling of economic policy issues.

Cited by 18 publications

References 16 publications

The National and Regional Consequences of Australia's Goods and Services Tax

The National and Regional Consequences of Australia's Goods and Services Tax

Strategic Tax Collection and Fiscal Decentralization: The Case of Russia

Does VAT have higher tax compliance than a turnover tax? Evidence from China

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