Advances in Dynamic Games and Applications 2000
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4612-1336-9_13
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A Game Variant of the Stopping Problem on Jump Processes with a Monotone Rule

Abstract: A continuous-time version of the multivariate stopping problem is considered. Associated with vector valued jump stochastic processes, stopping problems with a monotone logical rule are defined under the notion of Nash equilibrium point. The existence of an equilibrium strategy and its characterization by integral equations are obtained. Illustrative examples are provided.

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Cited by 2 publications
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“…Sakaguchi [30] and Kadane [12] have solved a multilateral sequential decision problem in which decisions whether to stop are made by the players alternately, instead of simultaneous decision under a monotone rule. The recent paper on the voting stopping problem are [20].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Sakaguchi [30] and Kadane [12] have solved a multilateral sequential decision problem in which decisions whether to stop are made by the players alternately, instead of simultaneous decision under a monotone rule. The recent paper on the voting stopping problem are [20].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%