A game theory analysis of green infrastructure stormwater management policies

Abstract

Green stormwater infrastructure has been demonstrated as an innovative water resources management approach that addresses multiple challenges facing urban environments. However, there is little consensus on what policy strategies can be used to best incentivize green infrastructure adoption by private landowners. Game theory, an analysis framework that has historically been under‐utilized within the context of stormwater management, is uniquely suited to address this policy question. We used a cooperative game theory framework to investigate the potential impacts of different policy strategies used to incentivize green infrastructure installation. The results indicate that municipal regulation leads to the greatest reduction in pollutant loading. However, the choice of the “best” regulatory approach will depend on a variety of different factors including politics and financial considerations. Large, downstream agents have a disproportionate share of bargaining power. Results also reveal that policy impacts are highly dependent on agents' spatial position within the stormwater network, leading to important questions of social equity and environmental justice.

Complex Network Analysis of Transmission Mechanism for Sustainable Incentive Policies

“…William et al used the cooperative game theory framework to study the potential impacts of different policy strategies with a stimulation of green infrastructure installation. They recommended the types of policies that could be used to motivate private landowners to adopt green infrastructure [30]. Zhao et al established an evolutionary game model to study the possible responses of enterprises to the implementation of incentive policies related to carbon emission labeling.…”

Expanding the Scope and Foundation of Sociohydrology as the Science of Coupled Human‐Water Systems

“…William et al () lend further support for the proposition that social position matters for modeling the human component of sociohydrological systems. This paper uses cooperative game theory to evaluate stormwater management approaches in the Gwynn Falls watershed, a highly urbanized watershed in West Baltimore, MD, USA.…”

Phase II MS4 challenges: moving toward effective stormwater management for small municipalities

“…Creating a utility service akin to services for domestic water and sewer use (or assigning management to an existing utility service) is an option for establishing a stormwater utility fee. Fees based on some measure of per-unit runoff or impervious cover level from parcels can directly fund stormwater management (Eisen 1995;National Research Council (NRC) 2009;Keeley et al 2013;Kea et al 2016), though they may not always be the most effective at abating pollution (William et al 2017). A variety of fee structures have been developed that can be considered by municipalities as they seek to balance ease of calculation, revenue generation, and the equitability of cost to landowners (Fedorchak et al 2017).…”

“…Free-market mechanisms generally work by a) providing an offset to encourage private landowner actions to increase stormwater uptake on their property (e.g., a fee reduction for quantity of runoff diverted and infiltrated) or b) a direct financial incentive to install BMPs on private property (e.g., a reverse auction; Thurston et al 2003;Barbosa et al 2012;Brown et al 2016;Nemes et al 2016). Fee reductions may be effective in incentivizing BMP installations on private property, but may also exacerbate inequity in certain communities, making the implementation of fees and fee reductions a highly local decision (Fedorchak et al 2017;William et al 2017William et al , 2020. Collaboration between small municipalities through the formation of stormwater coalitions may be another option to reduce costs by developing collective training programs, templates for ordinances and annual reports, public education materials and programs, and group purchasing or contracts of maintenance and good housekeeping measures (Chaffin et al 2016;Civian 2018).…”