2020 IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS) 2020
DOI: 10.1109/iros45743.2020.9340988
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

A Game-Theoretic Strategy-Aware Interaction Algorithm with Validation on Real Traffic Data

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
3
1
1

Citation Types

1
9
0

Year Published

2021
2021
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
5
3

Relationship

0
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 12 publications
(10 citation statements)
references
References 16 publications
1
9
0
Order By: Relevance
“…the agent type value for each model when the strategy matched the observation. The overall numbers in the table are in line with the converging consensus from recent literature that there is heterogeneity in driving behavior (Sarkar and Czarnecki 2021;Sun et al 2020). However, a major takeaway is that for non-strategic models, automata models show much higher accuracy thereby reflecting high alignment with human driving behavior compared to the maxmax model.…”
Section: Naturalistic Datasupporting
confidence: 83%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…the agent type value for each model when the strategy matched the observation. The overall numbers in the table are in line with the converging consensus from recent literature that there is heterogeneity in driving behavior (Sarkar and Czarnecki 2021;Sun et al 2020). However, a major takeaway is that for non-strategic models, automata models show much higher accuracy thereby reflecting high alignment with human driving behavior compared to the maxmax model.…”
Section: Naturalistic Datasupporting
confidence: 83%
“…As AVs integrate into human traffic, there has been a move from a predict-and-plan approach of behavior planning to a more strategic approach where the problem of behavior planning of an AV is set up as a non-zero sum game between road users and the AV; and such models have shown efficacy in simulation of different traffic scenarios (Fisac et al 2019;Tian et al 2018). However, when game theoretic models are evaluated on naturalistic human driving data, studies have shown that human driving behavior is diverse, and therefore developing a unifying framework that can both model the diversity of human driving behavior as well as plan a response from the perspective of an AV is challenging (Sarkar and Czarnecki 2021;Sun et al 2020).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…the driver becomes attentive when sees a pedestrian at the edge of the road. Other interesting methods in this topic can be found in [76], [77], [78], [79].…”
Section: Infocommunications Journalmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Such planners, referred to as strategic planners, view other road users in the vicinity as agents playing a game, and the AV chooses an action based on a game solution, for example, a Nash equilibrium. Such models have shown to be effective in simulation, and also have been evaluated against naturalistic human driving behavior [7], [8]. On the other hand, evaluation of safety is also arguably a multi-agent problem, based on the idea that the outcome of a traffic situation depends on the assumptions traffic agents have over each other as well as the collective behavior based on those assumptions.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The process of calculating the solution and executing the strategies is referred to as playing or solving the game. Some of the solution concepts that have been proposed in the literature for strategic planning in AVs include Nash equilibrium [5], [7], [23], [24], Stackelberg equilibrium [6], Qlk model [1]- [3], [7], and Pareto optimality [8].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%