2006
DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2005.03.003
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A game theoretic model of the Northwestern European electricity market—market power and the environment

Abstract: This paper develops a static computational game theoretic model. Illustrative results for the liberalising European electricity market are given to demonstrate the type of economic and environmental results that can be generated with the model. The model is empirically calibrated to eight Northwestern European countries, namely Belgium,

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Cited by 91 publications
(37 citation statements)
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“…Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) perform a Cournot analysis for the Californian market, assuming three Cournot competitors and a competitive Fringe. Lise et al (2006) apply a similar model to the Northwestern European electricity market and quantify how market power exertion by large producers harms consumers in different scenarios. Lise et al (2008) find that scarce European cross-border transmission capacity and dry weather lead to additional market power exertion potentials.…”
Section: Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) perform a Cournot analysis for the Californian market, assuming three Cournot competitors and a competitive Fringe. Lise et al (2006) apply a similar model to the Northwestern European electricity market and quantify how market power exertion by large producers harms consumers in different scenarios. Lise et al (2008) find that scarce European cross-border transmission capacity and dry weather lead to additional market power exertion potentials.…”
Section: Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The arguments in favour of liberalisation include the expectable price reduction for the consumers. For example, a recent simulation study conducted for some European countries, corroborates this view and concludes that the prices in perfect competition scenarios are lower than in high market power scenarios (Lise et al, 2006).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 50%
“…However, empirical results in the presence of market power are controversial. Wals and Rijkers [24], Sijm et al [23] as well as Bonacina and Gullì [25] find that electricity prices increase more in competitive scenarios than under market power, whereas Lise et al [16] and Newbery [26] state that the relationship is likely to be the other way around. These discrepancies result mainly from varying assumptions about and estimations of price elasticities.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Ellersdorfer [15] has applied a two-stage Cournot model to the German electricity market, finding that there is potential for the four dominant producers to exercise market power. Lise et al [16] show that there is potential for strategic behavior in Germany, but it is lower than in the near-monopolies of France and Belgium. Because suppliers in real electricity markets face uncertain demand, supply function equilibrium (SFE) models assume that producers bid functions of quantityprice-combinations, rather than a single quantity as assumed in Cournot games.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%