A Game-Theoretic Framework for Dynamic Spectrum Leasing (DSL) in Cognitive Radios

Abstract

In this paper we develop a game-theoretic framework for dynamic spectrum leasing in a cognitive radio network. Dynamic Spectrum Leasing, or DSL for short, is a new paradigm for efficient spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks that was proposed recently in [1]-[3]. DSL allows the primary users to actively encourage, or discourage, secondary access depending on their instantaneous Quality-of-Service (QoS) requirements and affordable power constraints. Secondary users, on the other hand, attempt to maximize throughput, or any other suitably chosen reward function, opportunistically, while not violating the interference limit set by the primary users. In this paper, we have proposed further generalization to the primary user utility function defined in [2] and a new utility function for the secondary users. We establish the conditions on the primary and secondary user utility functions so that the DSL game has desired equilibrium properties. Simulation results show the system behavior and performance at the equilibrium and also help to identify suitable system design parameters.

Optimal spectrum allocation of primary users in light-handed cognitive radio networks

“…A lot of work has been done on CR technologies, especially on network architectures, spectrum sensing and decision algorithms, as well as pricing tactics [7,8]. In [9], based on the dynamic spectrum leasing paradigm, a secondary user utility function is introduced satisfying the system equilibrium in a developed gametheoretic frame-work. A cognitive relay in the multiple-input and multiple-output communication scenarios is discussed, allowing secondary users to transmit simultaneously with the primary user instead of waiting for the spare spectrum holes.…”

Time-frequency spectrum leasing for OFDM-based Dynamic Spectrum Sharing systems

“…Resource allocation for spectrum underlay with attention to quality-of-service constraints for secondary users as well as interference constraints for the primary user is explored in [5]. A game-theoretic approach and the properties of equilibrium points for spectrum leasing are discussed in [6]. The interactions between sellers and buyers in the leasing process including competition, pricing, and decisions are discussed in [7] and [8].…”