A game theoretic approach for pricing, greening, and social welfare policies in a supply chain with government intervention

Sinayi, Mohammadreza; Rasti−Barzoki, Morteza

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.05.212

Cited by 177 publications

(72 citation statements)

References 32 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Literature on sustainability issues in the cooperative supply chain is also related to our paper. For example, Sinayi and Rasti-Barzoki [28] studied the effect of government intervention on the profits of the supply chain members, greening level of the product, and consumer surplus, and found that cooperation between members always results in greener products, more profit in the supply chain, and a higher consumer surplus. Hong and Guo [29] considered three different cooperation-level contracts, and pointed out that cooperation can improve the environmental performance but is not always profitable for all the members in the supply chain.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Does Licensing Remanufacturing Affect the Supply Chain Considering Customer Environmental Awareness?

et al. 2019

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

As sustainability issues are receiving increasing attention in society, in recent years many manufacturers have been adopting remanufacturing via technology licensing. This paper uses a game theory approach to investigate this strategy of a manufacturer under a closed-loop supply chain consisting of one supplier, one manufacturer, and one third-party remanufacturer (TPR), with the consideration of customer environmental awareness. In particular, the supplier supplies the components to the manufacturer and the manufacturer adopts technology licensing remanufacturing via the TPR. We explicitly characterize the reactions between the supplier and the manufacturer as being in equilibrium after adopting the technology licensing. We find that only when remanufacturing is a potential threat to the supplier is the performance of the supply chain improved and the double marginalization effect effectively eliminated. Moreover, remanufacturing by technology licensing only increases the profit of the manufacturer, but decreases the profit of the supplier. Interestingly, contrary to traditional wisdom, the existence of remanufactured products does not reduce the quantity of new products. Furthermore, remanufacturing by technology licensing may not always improve the environment, but customers in the market have environmental awareness that facilitates remanufacturing.

show abstract

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Does Licensing Remanufacturing Affect the Supply Chain Considering Customer Environmental Awareness?

et al. 2019

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Conrad (2005) took into account the influence of consumer environmental awareness and green product production costs in the process of green production decision-making, and made decisions based on maximizing social welfare [22]. Taking the three dimensions of sustainability (economy, environment, and social welfare) into account, Sinayi et al (2018) found that cooperation among members of the supply chain would produce products with higher greenness, which would benefit the whole supply chain and improve consumer welfare [23]. Taking a supply chain system composed of supplier, manufacturer, and the government as the research object, Guo et al (2016) investigated the effects of government green production subsidies on social welfare and the profit of supply chain members, and then obtained the optimal subsidy policy to maximize social welfare [24].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impacts of Green Production Decision on Social Welfare

et al. 2019

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

As an important approach of achieving sustainable development, green production plays a significant role in improving the ecological environment and total social welfare. In order to clarify the impacts of green production on social welfare favorably, this paper assumes that there are two types of consumers in the market: the green and the brown. Green consumers have green preference, focusing on the environmental and physical attributes of products; while brown consumers only value the physical attributes. We have obtained some intriguing conclusions through the use of the Hotelling model, as follows: (i) The total social welfare will benefit from green production. Meanwhile, we also find that the social welfare is likely to reach the highest value in scenario BG (i.e., both enterprises implement green production) or scenario SG (i.e., only one enterprise implements green production). (ii) Moreover, the total social welfare is always positively related to the degree of consumer green preference and unit of environmental benefit parameters in scenario SG and scenario BG. (iii) Finally, in scenario BG, the proportion of green consumers has a positive effect on the total social welfare, while only when certain conditions are satisfied, the higher proportion of green consumers will benefit the social welfare in scenario SG. Our findings can provide useful managerial insights for policy-makers in the development of green production.

show abstract

“…A fraction d of remanufactured products converts into same quality to the new product and sold as new one (Gao et al 2016;Taleizadeh et al 2018). Similar to the works in Saha et al (2016), Alamdar et al (2018), Sinayi and Rasti-Barzoki (2018), and Taleizadeh et al (2019), the effect of logistics costs in forward and reverse supply chain between manufacturer to customers is also normalized to zero to improve the clarity of the analytical findings. The manufacturer sells the rest of the products in secondary market with a price of w s .…”

Section: Problem Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If the government provides subsidy q 0 þ qh, then the price paid by the consumer to the retailer will be p À ðq 0 þ qhÞ. The similar incentive policy is studied by the researches (Chu et al 2018;Sinayi and Rasti-Barzoki 2018) in the existing literature if q ¼ 0. However, green purchasing decision and amount of incentives depend on GL of the product (Mannberg et al 2014;Houde and Aldy 2014).…”

Section: Problem Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Dilemma in two game structures for a closed-loop supply chain under the influence of government incentives

Saha

Nielsen

Majumder³

2019

J Ind Eng Int

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The government organizations grant incentives to promote green product consumption, improve green product quality, boost remanufacturing activities, etc. through various policies. The objective of this study is to highlight pros and cons of two incentive policies, namely (1) incentive on manufacturer's R&D investment and (2) direct incentive to consumer based on greening level of the product on the optimal pricing and investment decisions in improving used product return and greening level decisions in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). Optimal decisions are derived under manufacturer and retailer-Stackelberg games, and results are compared to explore characteristics of optimal decisions, consumer surplus, and environmental improvement under two marketing strategies of a manufacturer. It is found that the greening level and used product return rate in a CLSC are always higher under retailer-Stackelberg game. If the manufacturer sets a target for greening level, the CLSC members may receive higher profits if consumer receives incentive because of higher consumer surplus. However, environmental improvement may be lower. If the manufacturer sets a product return goal, then CLSC members may compromise with consumer surplus or environmental improvement for receiving higher profits. In the presence of direct incentive to consumers, CLSC members can trade with product at lower greening level for higher profits. Moreover, investment in improving used product return is always less compared to the investment in improving greening level. 15 (Suppl 1):S291-S308 https://doi.org/10.1007/s40092-019-00333-z( 0123456789().,-volV) (0123456789().,-volV) Literature reviewThis study is largely concerned with governments incentive and game structure in CLSC, and the literature on priceand GL-sensitive demand. In the following paragraphs, we discuss two important topics in the literature to highlight the motivation and importance of this study. 2 www8.

show abstract

A game theoretic approach for pricing, greening, and social welfare policies in a supply chain with government intervention

Cited by 177 publications

References 32 publications

How Does Licensing Remanufacturing Affect the Supply Chain Considering Customer Environmental Awareness?

How Does Licensing Remanufacturing Affect the Supply Chain Considering Customer Environmental Awareness?

Impacts of Green Production Decision on Social Welfare

Dilemma in two game structures for a closed-loop supply chain under the influence of government incentives

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About