2021
DOI: 10.1016/j.wasman.2020.10.043
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A game-theoretic approach for decision analysis in end-of-life vehicle reverse supply chain regarding government subsidy

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Cited by 36 publications
(18 citation statements)
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“…However, the allocation of subsidies would inspire the remanufacturers of the vehicle's part, but the imposed legislation still limits it. Gorji et al (2021) stated that the government subsidies policy is an efficient strategy to alleviate ELV in the entire supply chain. This emphasises the importance of close collaboration among various ELV stakeholders to achieve a win-win situation in business profit sharing and improve the ELV recovery.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…However, the allocation of subsidies would inspire the remanufacturers of the vehicle's part, but the imposed legislation still limits it. Gorji et al (2021) stated that the government subsidies policy is an efficient strategy to alleviate ELV in the entire supply chain. This emphasises the importance of close collaboration among various ELV stakeholders to achieve a win-win situation in business profit sharing and improve the ELV recovery.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A situational analysis can accommodate the volatility of different simulation factors under multiple scenarios in the identified period. Gorji et al (2021) stated that the government's policy acts as a critical role in increasing the collection of ELV by providing subsidies to encourage the collection of a greater volume of ELV. Future studies can be expanded to involve the remanufacturing centre in adapting this centralised (cooperative) scenario to benefit from collecting the ELV.…”
Section: Reverse Logistic Network Designmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Under the Stackelberg game, Wu et al ( 2020 ) developed quantitative models of two-level CLSCs that are environmentally friendly to examine investment decisions about environmental responsibility, pricing, and collection rates. Gorji et al ( 2021 ) studied vehicles CLSC, where the government pays the take-back centers to deliver their used vehicles. In another study, Wen et al ( 2020 ) investigated game models to examine the rate of collection as well as price decisions by taking into account environmentally responsible heterogeneous consumers.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In order, to make it more systematic, risk factors are implemented into the model. Gorji et al [14] have considered a supply chain including an end-of-life vehicles (ELV) take-back centre, an inspection centre, and a repair centre. Three decision variables seem to be the purchase price of the ELVs, the sales price of the repaired vehicle and the level of the reconstruction of the vehicle.…”
Section: The Literature On Reverse Supply Chainmentioning
confidence: 99%