A game-theoretic analysis of information sharing and security investment for complementary firms

Gao, Xing; Wang, Zhong; Mei, Shue

doi:10.1057/jors.2013.133

Cited by 48 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Their findings showed that higher effectiveness of inhibiting knowledge dissemination did not mean a higher investment. Gao et al (2014) analyzed the information sharing strategies and information security investing strategies of two firms by assuming that their information assets were complementary. They acquired the optimal strategies for the two firms and the attacker.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

A game-theoretic analysis of information security investment for multiple firms in a network

Qian

Liu

Pei

et al. 2017

Journal of the Operational Research Society

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The application of Internet of Things promotes the cooperation among firms, and it also introduces some information security issues. Due to the vulnerability of the communication network, firms need to invest in information security technologies to protect their confidential information. In this paper, considering the multiple-step propagation of a security breach in a fully connected network, an information security investment game among n firms is investigated. We make meticulous theoretic and experimental analyses on both the Nash equilibrium solution and the optimal solution. The results show that a larger network size (n) or a larger one-step propagation probability (q) has a negative effect on the Nash equilibrium investment. The optimal investment does not necessarily increase in n or q, and its variation trend depends on the concrete conditions. A compensation mechanism is proposed to encourage firms to coordinate their strategies and invest a higher amount equal to the optimal investment when they make decisions individually. At last, our model is extended by considering another direct breach probability function and another network structure, respectively. We find that a higher connection density of the network will result in a greater expected cost for each firm.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

A game-theoretic analysis of information security investment for multiple firms in a network

Qian

Liu

Pei

et al. 2017

Journal of the Operational Research Society

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“…Considering attacker behavior and leakage costs, Gao et al [7] discussed the relationship between security investment and information sharing. Their findings showed that firms should devote significant attention to their relationship with other firms when strategically choosing security investment.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sustainability of Information Security Investment in Online Social Networks: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Approach

2018

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With the rapid development of information technologies, security violations in online social networks (OSN) have emerged as a critical issue. Traditional technical and organizational approaches do not consider economic factors, which are increasingly important to sustain information security investment. In this paper, we develop an evolutionary game model to study the sustainability of information security investment in OSN, and propose a quantitative approach to analyze and optimize security investment. Additionally, we examine a contract with an incentive mechanism to eliminate free riding, which helps sustain the security investment. Numerical examples are provided for illustration and simulation purposes, leading to several countermeasures and suggestions. Our analytical results show that the optimal strategy of information security investment not only is correlated with profit growth coefficients and investment costs, but is also influenced significantly by the profits from free riding. If the profit growth coefficients are prohibitively small, both OSN service providers and online platforms will not choose to sustain investment based on small profits. As profit growth coefficients increase, there is a higher probability that game players will invest. Another major finding is that the (Invest, Invest) profile is much less sensitive to the change of profit growth coefficients and the convergent speed of this scenario is faster than the other profiles. The government agency can use the proposed model to determine a proper incentive or penalty to help both parties reach the optimal strategies and thus improve OSN security.

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“…Gao et al . also analyze the effect of a social planner on social total costs by assuming that it can control information sharing . It is also important to consider the time dimension when studying the interactions between stakeholders in information sharing, such as the sequence of moves of the social planner and agents, as studied by Hauksen …”

Section: Current Information Sharing Architecturesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perspectives on Cybersecurity Information Sharing among Multiple Stakeholders Using a Decision‐Theoretic Approach

Devine

Zhuang

2017

Risk Analysis

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The government, private sectors, and others users of the Internet are increasingly faced with the risk of cyber incidents. Damage to computer systems and theft of sensitive data caused by cyber attacks have the potential to result in lasting harm to entities under attack, or to society as a whole. The effects of cyber attacks are not always obvious, and detecting them is not a simple proposition. As the U.S. federal government believes that information sharing on cybersecurity issues among organizations is essential to safety, security, and resilience, the importance of trusted information exchange has been emphasized to support public and private decision making by encouraging the creation of the Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC). Through a decision-theoretic approach, this article provides new perspectives on ISAC, and the advent of the new Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs), which are intended to provide similar benefits to organizations that cannot fit easily into the ISAC structure. To help understand the processes of information sharing against cyber threats, this article illustrates 15 representative information sharing structures between ISAC, government, and other participating entities, and provide discussions on the strategic interactions between different stakeholders. This article also identifies the costs of information sharing and information security borne by different parties in this public-private partnership both before and after cyber attacks, as well as the two main benefits. This article provides perspectives on the mechanism of information sharing and some detailed cost-benefit analysis.

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A game-theoretic analysis of information sharing and security investment for complementary firms

Cited by 48 publications

References 16 publications

A game-theoretic analysis of information security investment for multiple firms in a network

A game-theoretic analysis of information security investment for multiple firms in a network

Sustainability of Information Security Investment in Online Social Networks: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Approach

Perspectives on Cybersecurity Information Sharing among Multiple Stakeholders Using a Decision‐Theoretic Approach

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