A fuzzy game theoretic approach for groundwater resources management: Application of Rubinstein Bargaining Theory

Kerachian, Reza; Fallahnia, Mahsa; Bazargan‐Lari, Mohammad Reza; Mansoori, Abbas; Sedghi, Hossein

doi:10.1016/j.resconrec.2009.11.008

Cited by 70 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Intuition and experience as well as some intelligence methods may help to assign them. For instance, in their case study Kerachian et al 2010 utilize the fuzzy set theory to better define uncertainty in utility functions, which, together with discount factors, define the preferences of parties. Another approach would be to introduce the learning stimuli in the bargaining strategies based on the information gathered, but this requires longer sequences of negotiation periods.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The Rubinstein-Ståhl game has been applied to model practical bargaining settings, such as labor negotiation (Vannetelbosch 1997) or conflict resolution in the conjunctive use of surface and groundwater resources (Kerachian et al 2010). It provides a suitable tool to model CER pricing, since impatient bargaining plays an important role in this kind of negotiations.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Pricing of uncertain certified emission reductions in a Chinese coal mine methane project with an extended Rubinstein-Ståhl model

Horabik

Nahorski

2014

Climatic Change

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The development of coal mine methane (CMM) projects is subject to various kinds of risk, one of these being their highly variable methane content. In this study, a new methodology is proposed to reflect the impact of this uncertainty on a negotiated Certified Emission Reduction (CER) price, which is based on the available information. To simulate a process of price negotiation the Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining game is utilized, where a buyer's discount factor is unknown. It is assumed that a buyer's willingness to accomplish price negotiations depends on the CER uncertainty. The bargaining model has been extended by introducing dependence of its three parameters on the probability of a failure to fulfil the contracted CER amount. To quantify this probability, we develop a conditional distribution given information on the point estimate of methane amount for the project under consideration, and on the distribution of available estimates from coal mines having similar characteristics. The proposed approach is applied to a particular CMM capture and utilization project in Anhui province, China. The results indicate that the uncertainty influence is significant, particularly when the credibility of a seller increases, i.e. the probability of a failure to fulfil the project decreases. The analysis can be of use to both negotiating parties at an early stage of a comprehensive CMM project planning.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

Pricing of uncertain certified emission reductions in a Chinese coal mine methane project with an extended Rubinstein-Ståhl model

Horabik

Nahorski

2014

Climatic Change

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“…Cooperative game theoretic has already been extensively used in water resources' allocation (e.g., Abed-Elmdoust and Kerachian 2012;PoorsepahySamian et al 2012;Liao and Hannam 2013). On the other hand, self-optimizing approach of water users in exploiting surface and groundwater resources often consequences a non-cooperative behavior in common pool resources (Madani 2010;Kerachian et al 2010;Rafipour-Langeroudi et al 2014). Non-cooperative and competitive manners of beneficiaries in common pool resources unavoidably lead to tragedy of the commons (Gordon 1954;Hardin 1968;Loaiciga 2004).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Heuristic Evolutionary Game Theoretic Methodology for Conjunctive Use of Surface and Groundwater Resources

Parsapour-Moghaddam

Abed-Elmdoust

Kerachian

2015

Water Resour Manage

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In this paper, a methodology based on a new heuristic evolutionary game is developed to determine evolutionary stable equilibrium (ESE) strategies for conjunctive surface and groundwater allocation to water users with conflicting objectives. The methodology provides reasonable and realistic framework to illuminate noncooperative behaviors of water users in the joint usage of surface and groundwater resources. The developed heuristic evolutionary game theoretic approach can be used for finding equilibrium in asymmetric n-person games with continuous strategies. The penalty function is provided in a way that it can control groundwater table drawdown at monitoring points. It is also shown that applying the proposed penalty function may inhibit the water users' excessive exploitation and can consequently avoid the tragedy of commons. As the methodology needs to run water allocation optimization and groundwater simulation models for several times, an optimization model based on genetic algorithms is linked with MODFLOW groundwater simulation model. Furthermore, a computational cost reduction method has been used to reduce the computation time caused by several consecutive computational steps in the proposed Water Resour Manage

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“…Results showed that the cooperative method is more successful to achieve more revenue in utilizing the surface water resource while the river water quantity and quality issues are addressed. Kerachian et al (2010) applied Rubinstein's bargaining theory which is a fuzzy game theoretic approach for groundwater resource management. They coupled the aforementioned approach to the NSGA-II to extract an appropriate solution from the trade-off curve.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effect of Utility Function Curvature of Young’s Bargaining Method on the Design of WDNs

Fallah-Mehdipour

Bozorg‐Haddad

Beygi

et al. 2011

Water Resour Manage

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The optimal design of a water distribution network is a simulationoptimization task that should consider conflicts between different groups of stakeholders directly or indirectly. Investors and consumers are two groups of stakeholders with conflicting goals. Young's bargaining method is a decision tool based on game theory that can help decision-makers to select one of the design alternatives by considering utilities of stakeholders. In this paper, the optimal design of two benchmark network problems (Two-loop and Hanoi networks) is considered with minimization of design cost and maximization of system efficiency, with respect to increasing hydraulic pressure. In this regard, decision alternatives are first determined by using a multi-objective, fast, messy genetic algorithm (MOFMGA). E. Fallah-Mehdipour et al.Young's bargaining method is then applied with different combinations of utility functions of stakeholders. Results show that the use of the same utility functions for both stakeholders improves 63.23% and 24.47% of investor goals and 79.08% and 45.69% of consumer goals compared to the worst possible alternatives in the Twoloop and Hanoi networks, respectively. Moreover, both investor and consumer goals improve 6.19% and 7.14% in the Two-loop and 22.73% and 6.07% in the Hanoi network using a more concave utility function whose emphasis is on stakeholder utility, respectively.

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A fuzzy game theoretic approach for groundwater resources management: Application of Rubinstein Bargaining Theory

Cited by 70 publications

References 20 publications

Pricing of uncertain certified emission reductions in a Chinese coal mine methane project with an extended Rubinstein-Ståhl model

Pricing of uncertain certified emission reductions in a Chinese coal mine methane project with an extended Rubinstein-Ståhl model

A Heuristic Evolutionary Game Theoretic Methodology for Conjunctive Use of Surface and Groundwater Resources

Effect of Utility Function Curvature of Young’s Bargaining Method on the Design of WDNs

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