A free dialogical logic for surrogate reasoning: generation of hypothesis without ontological commitments

Abstract

This article aims to present a Free Dialogic Logic [FDL] as a general framework for hypothesis generation in the practice of modelling in science. Our proposal is based on the idea that the inferential function that models fulfil during the modelling process (surrogate reasoning) should be carried out without ontological commitments. The starting point to achieve our objective is that the scientific consideration of models without a target is a symptom that, on the one hand, the Applicability of Logic should be considered among the conditions of adequacy that should take into account all modeling process and, on the other, that the inferential apparatus at the base of the surrogate reasoning process must be rid of realistic assumptions that lead to erroneous conclusions. In this sense, we propose as an alternative an ontologically neutral inferential system in the perspective of dialogical pragmatism.

¿Razonamiento subrogativo como pensamiento basado en la representación o en la lógica?

“…That is, we define a problematic portion of phenomena (PPP henceforth) as that which presents itself as a real challenge to understanding. Either because we do not know if it is there or if it is one, if there are many, or what exactly is there -it is an ontologically uncertain phenomenon (Redmond, 2021)-. And we do not know the latter because of our limitations relative to both macro and micro of this portion and its complexity.…”

“…In the face of these challenges, different approaches have taken them seriously and resolved each of them to a greater or lesser degree. A summary of these approaches can be found in Frigg and Nguyen (2017) and Redmond (2021). For the interest of our paper, we will now focus only on the notion of surrogate reasoning.…”

Punto de vista lógico y no representacionista del razonamiento sustitutivo

“…¿Cómo se puede fundamentar la afirmación de que un proceso lógico, como el razonamiento sustitutivo, sea considerado un tipo de pensamiento basado en la representación? Creemos que esto se explica del siguiente modo: solo considerando un enfoque realista-representacionista de la relación entre M y SO, cuyo resguardo es el de la lógica clásica como lógica subyacente del razonamiento sustitutivo (Redmond, 2021a). Veamos más en detalle estos puntos.…”

“…Cuál es Punto de vista lógico y no representacionista del razonamiento sustitutivo el mejor aparato lógico para ello es una cuestión que debe ser tratada más en extenso. Una propuesta al respecto la hemos ofrecido en Redmond (2021a;2021b).…”

“…En definitiva, diremos que el modelo permite establecer ciertos compromisos con la porción problemática de los fenómenos a la que se dirige -en adelante, PPF- (Redmond, 2021a). Y de todos esos compromisos, nos ocuparemos de aquel que nos permite generar conclusiones a partir del modelo, conclusiones que poseen el carácter de hipótesis respecto de la PPF.…”