A Framework for Investigating Animal Consciousness

Droege, Paula; Braithwaite, Valerie

doi:10.1007/7854_2014_278

Cited by 18 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 73 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Given the specious relationship between complex behaviors and conscious awareness, there is some support for the idea that “flexible behavior” (i.e., the ability of an animal to adapt its behavior in response to changing environments or novel challenges; Griffin, 1976 ) is a better indicator of conscious awareness ( Bekoff, 2003 ; Edelman and Seth, 2009 ; Seth, 2009 ; Droege and Braithwaite, 2014 ; Mather and Carere, 2016 ). However, conflating flexible behavior with feelings remains problematic, since even innate, stereotyped behaviors are known to exhibit considerable plasticity.…”

Section: Behavior Is Not Sufficient To Infer Conscious Awarenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Designing Brains for Pain: Human to Mollusc

Key

Brown

2018

Front. Physiol.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

There is compelling evidence that the “what it feels like” subjective experience of sensory stimuli arises in the cerebral cortex in both humans as well as mammalian experimental animal models. Humans are alone in their ability to verbally communicate their experience of the external environment. In other species, sensory awareness is extrapolated on the basis of behavioral indicators. For instance, cephalopods have been claimed to be sentient on the basis of their complex behavior and anecdotal reports of human-like intelligence. We have interrogated the findings of avoidance learning behavioral paradigms and classical brain lesion studies and conclude that there is no evidence for cephalopods feeling pain. This analysis highlighted the questionable nature of anthropometric assumptions about sensory experience with increased phylogenetic distance from humans. We contend that understanding whether invertebrates such as molluscs are sentient should first begin with defining the computational processes and neural circuitries underpinning subjective awareness. Using fundamental design principles, we advance the notion that subjective awareness is dependent on observer neural networks (networks that in some sense introspect the neural processing generating neural representations of sensory stimuli). This introspective process allows the observer network to create an internal model that predicts the neural processing taking place in the network being surveyed. Predictions arising from the internal model form the basis of a rudimentary form of awareness. We develop an algorithm built on parallel observer networks that generates multiple levels of sensory awareness. A network of cortical regions in the human brain has the appropriate functional properties and neural interconnectivity that is consistent with the predicted circuitry of the algorithm generating pain awareness. By contrast, the cephalopod brain lacks the necessary neural circuitry to implement such an algorithm. In conclusion, we find no compelling behavioral, functional, or neuroanatomical evidence to indicate that cephalopods feel pain.

show abstract

Section: Behavior Is Not Sufficient To Infer Conscious Awarenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Designing Brains for Pain: Human to Mollusc

Key

Brown

2018

Front. Physiol.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…During the experimental tests, then, the bystander fish responded to these pre-experimentally learned cues when they chose to pair with weaker combatant fish. This explanation disagrees with the interpretation that inference was made from naïve observations of the outcome of fights among combatants made during the experimental sessions (Droege and Braithwaite 2014;Grosenick et al 2007;Woodruff 2017). This disagreement is one that can be resolved empirically.…”

Section: Transitive Inference In Cichlids As An Indicator Of Sentiencementioning

confidence: 67%

Sentience in fishes: More on the evidence

Woodruff¹

2018

Animal Sentience

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…Others stress that the most important duty is to prevent suffering. These differences have their origin in the why question, i.e., the various arguments that underlie the claim of animals having moral standing, such as sentience, ability to suffer, higher cognitive abilities, capacity to flourish, sociability and animals being "subjects-of-life" [10][11][12][13].…”

Section: The Ongoing Ethical Debate: Animals As Moral Subjectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Joining forces: the need to combine science and ethics to address problems of validity and translation in neuropsychiatry research using animal models

Meijboom

Kostrzewa

Leenaars

2020

Philos Ethics Humanit Med

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Background: Current policies regulating the use of animals for scientific purposes are based on balancing between potential gain of knowledge and suffering of animals used in experimentation. The balancing process is complicated, on the one hand by plurality of views on our duties towards animals, and on the other hand by more recent discussions on uncertainty in the probability of reaching the final aim of the research and problems of translational failure. Methods: The study combines ethical analysis based on a literature review with neuropsychiatry-related preclinical research as a case study. Results: Based on the analysis and the case study we show that neuropsychiatry-related preclinical research is an especially interesting case from an ethical perspective. The 3R principles (Replacement, Reduction and Refinement) are used to minimize the negative consequences for the animals used in research. However, neuropsychiatric research is characterized by specific challenges in assessing the probability of success of reaching the final aim, due to our limited mechanistic knowledge of human neuropsychiatric illness. Consequently, the translational value of the currently used animal models may be difficult to prove, which undermines the validity of these models and complicated the ethical assessment. Conclusions: We conclude that a combined approach that deals with both science and the ethical dimensions is necessary to address the problems of validity and translation in neuropsychiatry-related preclinical research. We suggest this approach to comprise first, improved experimental methods, e.g. by using systematic reviews, second, a more patients-based approach that leads to models that reflect interindividual variation better, and third, more interdisciplinary cooperation.

show abstract

A Framework for Investigating Animal Consciousness

Cited by 18 publications

References 73 publications

Designing Brains for Pain: Human to Mollusc

Designing Brains for Pain: Human to Mollusc

Sentience in fishes: More on the evidence

Joining forces: the need to combine science and ethics to address problems of validity and translation in neuropsychiatry research using animal models

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About