A Framework for Grounding the Moral Status of Intelligent Machines

Abstract

I propose a framework, derived from moral theory, for assessing the moral status of intelligent machines. Using this framework, I claim that some current and foreseeable intelligent machines have approximately as much moral status as plants, trees, and other environmental entities. This claim raises the question: what obligations could a moral agent (e.g., a normal adult human) have toward an intelligent machine? I propose that the threshold for any moral obligation should be the "functional morality" of Wallach and Allen [20], while the upper limit of our obligations should not exceed the upper limit of our obligations toward plants, trees, and other environmental entities.

The Moral Consideration of Artificial Entities: A Literature Review

“…There is some brief discussion of abuse of robots. They note that verbal abuse towards machines might not matter morally, apart from insofar as it "sets the wrong normative tone in the environment" and may have negative indirect effects on observers Schafer (2016) Schafer analyzes the European Parliament's Resolution that relates to electronic personhood and discusses it through comparison and analogy to science fiction writings Scheessele (2018) The article argues that, "some current and foreseeable intelligent machines have approximately as much moral status as plants, trees, and other environmental entities… the upper limit of our obligations should not exceed the upper limit of our obligations toward plants, trees, and other environmental entities." "Moral agency" is seen as a key criterion and consciousness is not presented as required for an entity to have "a good of its own" Schmetkamp (2020) Schmetkamp argues that we can have empathy for social robots.…”

The hard limit on human nonanthropocentrism

“…Suppose further that it is endowed with the functional morality described by Wallach and Allen (2009), but lacks consciousness. Arguably, this machine could have "a good of its own" (Scheessele 2018;Basl and Sandler 2013;Kaufmann 1994). Each human (as well as each living thing) also has a "good of its own."…”

“…Each human (as well as each living thing) also has a "good of its own." Using this common denominator (i.e., having a good of its own) as a threshold for moral status, the machine could have moral status (Scheessele 2018;Basl and Sandler 2013;Kaufmann 1994). Recall, however, that "thinking otherwise" seeks to avoid reducing difference to sameness in determining moral status of an Other.…”

“…Accordingly, animal (Singer 1974;Regan 1985), environmental (Taylor 1981(Taylor /2010Leopold 1949Leopold /1977Leopold /2010, and information ethicists (Floridi 2008;Floridi and Sanders 2004) argue for moral consideration of non-human entities. Given continuing advances in artificial intelligence, some even insist that we could have moral obligations to intelligent machines Scheessele 2018;Tavani 2018;Gerdes 2015;Coeckelbergh 2010). 1 Even so, some worry about a continuing destructive impact of anthropocentrism ).…”

“…With respect to intelligent machines, Gunkel illuminates the disparity between the focus on obligations of an intelligent machine toward us (i.e., a moral agent-based perspective) and on our potential obligations toward an intelligent machine (i.e., a moral patient-based perspective). Since then, attention to the question of moral status for intelligent machines has increased (Gunkel 2014;Gerdes 2015;Scheessele 2018;Tavani 2018), coupled with everlouder calls for moral and legal robot rights (Prodhan 2016;Gunkel 2014;2018a;2018b). Anthropocentrism, according to thinkers such as , is a chief obstacle to the determination of moral status of, and extension of rights to, intelligent machines.…”