2019
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-32079-9_18
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A Formally Verified Monitor for Metric First-Order Temporal Logic

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Cited by 23 publications
(23 citation statements)
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“…Similar work on verifying dynamic programming monitors for LTL that uses the Isabelle/HOL proof assistant [33] is also limited to finite traces. Isabelle/HOL is used in [35] to extract certifiably-correct monitoring code from specifications expressed in Metric First-Order Temporal Logic (MFOTL). Although MFOTL uses quantifications over event data (similar to ours), the analysis in [35] is limited to formulas that are satisfied by finitely-many valuations; our techniques do not have this restriction.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Similar work on verifying dynamic programming monitors for LTL that uses the Isabelle/HOL proof assistant [33] is also limited to finite traces. Isabelle/HOL is used in [35] to extract certifiably-correct monitoring code from specifications expressed in Metric First-Order Temporal Logic (MFOTL). Although MFOTL uses quantifications over event data (similar to ours), the analysis in [35] is limited to formulas that are satisfied by finitely-many valuations; our techniques do not have this restriction.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Isabelle/HOL is used in [35] to extract certifiably-correct monitoring code from specifications expressed in Metric First-Order Temporal Logic (MFOTL). Although MFOTL uses quantifications over event data (similar to ours), the analysis in [35] is limited to formulas that are satisfied by finitely-many valuations; our techniques do not have this restriction. Further afield, the work in [31] uses symbolic analysis and SMT solvers to reason about the runtime monitoring of contracts.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The R2U2 [27,35] tool in particular implements mtl monitors on fpga while allowing for future-time specifications. Further, there are approaches for generating verified monitors for logics [2,34].…”
Section: Bibliographic Remarksmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The safety assumption requires that any negated subformula is guarded by a non-negated subformula, such that ϕ can be monitored using finite relations [14,54]. (Safe formulas are called monitorable in these references.)…”
Section: Lemmamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Both our implementation [53] and formalization [55] are publicly available. The formal verification of an MFOTL monitor modeled after MonPoly has been addressed in a separate line of work [11,54].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%