A Formal Model of Church and Sect

Iannaccone, Laurence R.

doi:10.1086/228948

Cited by 236 publications

(115 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…This is not essential and the analysis can be performed without it, at the cost of exposition clarity. 7 As supported by Iannaccone (1988).…”

Section: Basic Model With One Churchmentioning

confidence: 75%

“…2 This is not, however, the only approach that provides insight into the determinants of the religious 'supply side'. An alternative view is to pose that a church maximizes the welfare of its members as in Iannaccone (1988Iannaccone ( , 1992) and Zdeski and Zech (1992). Cassone and Marchese (1999) extensively discuss this approach.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Considerations of the existence of free-riders and monitoring costs can be found in Iannaccone (1988Iannaccone ( , 1992Iannaccone ( , 1994a) and Montgomery (1996a). Clubtheoretic models of high-cost sects and easygoing churches aim at integrating a large body of evidence.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

An Economic Theory of Church Strictness

Garoupa

Barros

2002

SSRN Journal

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This paper makes several contributions to the growing literature on the economics of religion. First, we explicitly introduce spatiallocation models into the economics of religion. Second, we offer a new explanation for the observed tendency of state (monopoly) churches to locate toward the "low-tension" end of the "strictness continuum" (in a one-dimensional product space): This result is obtained through the conjunction of "benevolent preferences" (denominations care about the aggregate utility of members) and asymmetric costs of going to a more or less strict church than one prefers.We also derive implications regarding the relationship between religious strictness and membership. The driving forces of our analysis, religious market interactions and asymmetric costs of membership, highlight new explanations for some well-established stylized facts. The analysis opens the way to new empirical tests, aimed at confronting the implications of our model against more traditional explanations.

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“…This is not essential and the analysis can be performed without it, at the cost of exposition clarity. 7 As supported by Iannaccone (1988).…”

Section: Basic Model With One Churchmentioning

confidence: 75%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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An Economic Theory of Church Strictness

Garoupa

Barros

2002

SSRN Journal

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“…Weber, who elsewhere discussed the nature of bureaucracies, showed little interest in the internal structure of religions in The Sociology of Religion. Rational actor models of religion have a prominent place in sociology (see for example, Young (1997), but most of this line of research has focused on religious competition (Finke, 1997) or why religions are strict (Iannaccone, 1988).…”

Section: Strategic Behavior and Organizational Structure Of Religionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Behavior and Organizational Structure in Religions

Wittman¹

2013

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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ABSTRACT:Religions are organized in a variety of ways. They may resemble an elected autocracy, a parliamentary democracy, or something akin to a monarchy, where heredity plays a primary role. This variation allows for a comparative study of their organization.These differing power arrangements call for different types of strategic behavior in the fight for control over church doctrine and finance. And they also induce different institutional responses. I show where screening is highly institutionalized and when the age of a person may be an important strategic factor in choosing a leader. I am thus able to explain what otherwise would be very puzzling differences in the age of appointment across religions and within a particular religion, overtime.In a nutshell, this paper is about politics and strategic behavior in the large (democracy versus autocracy) within the context of the small (religious institutions).

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“…The authors note that, during their interviews, they were -struck by how racially homogenous the social worlds of most evangelicals are‖ ( [20], p. 80). Evangelical Protestant congregations tend to foster strong in-group ties that limit members' non-group activities and create dense intra-group social networks [31][32][33][34]. Evangelical Protestant congregations are also less involved in the provision of social services and offer fewer community outreach programs than congregations in other religious traditions [35][36][37].…”

Section: Social Networkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Neighbors Like Me? Religious Affiliation and Neighborhood Racial Preferences among Non-Hispanic Whites

Merino

2011

Religions

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Abstract:Research on racial residential segregation has paid little attention to the role that social institutions play in either isolating or integrating racial and ethnic groups in American communities. Scholars have argued that racial segregation within American religion may contribute to and consolidate racial division elsewhere in social life. However, no previous study has employed national survey data to examine the relationship between religious affiliation and the preferences people have about the racial and ethnic composition of their neighborhoods. Using data from the -Multi-Ethnic United States‖ module on the 2000 General Social Survey, this study finds that white evangelical Protestants have a significantly stronger preference for same-race neighbors than do Catholics, Jews, adherents of -other‖ faiths, and the unaffiliated. Group differences in preferences are largely accounted for by socio-demographic characteristics. Negative racial stereotyping and social isolation from minorities, both topics of interest in recent research on evangelical Protestants and race, fail to explain group differences in preferences.

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A Formal Model of Church and Sect

Cited by 236 publications

References 29 publications

An Economic Theory of Church Strictness

An Economic Theory of Church Strictness

Strategic Behavior and Organizational Structure in Religions

Neighbors Like Me? Religious Affiliation and Neighborhood Racial Preferences among Non-Hispanic Whites

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