A fixed cost allocation based on the two-stage network data envelopment approach

Yu, Ming‐Miin; Chen, Li‐Hsueh; Hsiao, Bo

doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2015.10.062

Cited by 39 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…Of these, Golany et al [10], Kao [12], Kao and Hwang [14], Wu [25], Fukuyama and Weber [8], Cook and Zhu [6] and Lozano [18] introduced models for evaluating the efficiency of two-stage systems. And Yu et al [27] proposed a novel fixed cost allocation based on the two-stage network DEA approach to measure the efficiency of the overall system and of the individual processes. Ma et al [19] proposed an approach for efficiency measurement and decomposition in hybrid two-stage DEA with additional inputs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A bargaining game model for measuring efficiency of two-stage network DEA with non-discretionary inputs

Abdali

Fallahnejad

2020

International Journal of Computer Mathematics: Computer Systems

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Conventional data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a method for measuring the efficiency of decision-making units (DMUs). Recently, to measure the efficiency of sub-DMUs (Stages), several network DEA models have been developed, in which the results of network DEA models not only provide the overall efficiency of the whole system but also provide the efficiency of the individual stages. This study develops a bargaining game model for measuring the efficiency of DMUs that have a two-stage network structure with non-discretionary inputs, that the model as a method of dealing with the conflict arising from the intermediate measures. Under the Nash bargaining game theory, the two stages in the network DEA are considered as players and network DEA model is a cooperative game model. Here, the non-discretionary additional inputs in the second stage make changes in the cooperative game model, so that managers of units cannot change the value of non-discretionary inputs in measuring the efficiency of the bargaining game model, and this causes the desired and expected output of the managers not to be produced. In addition, it can be stated that the presence of such inputs is capable, significantly affecting the system efficiency score and stages. So that the existence of the inputs in the measuring efficiency of decision-making units reduces the efficiency score of cooperative game. In this study, linearizing the model in the presence of the non-discretionary input is a new idea in the bargaining game model. A numerical example shows the applicability of the new model.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A bargaining game model for measuring efficiency of two-stage network DEA with non-discretionary inputs

Abdali

Fallahnejad

2020

International Journal of Computer Mathematics: Computer Systems

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“…In addition to efficiency evaluation, some scholars have studied fixed cost allocation based on the two-stage DEA model in recent years. Yu et al [38] proposed a fixed cost allocation method based on the two-stage network DEA and the cross-efficiency to allocate the fixed cost adequately. Zhu et al [39] discussed the fixed cost allocation problem by using a two-stage network DEA method and proposed three procedures to obtain a fair cost allocation plan based on different objectives in reality.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Carbon Emission Allocation in a Chinese Province-Level Region Based on Two-Stage Network Structures

et al. 2019

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With the increasingly severe global environment and climate change, the growing social attention toward the environmental problems has prompted local governments to make policy adjustments. The formulation of the carbon emission right allocation scheme is important for policy-makers. Many researchers have studied the problem of carbon emission right allocation by using data envelopment analysis (DEA) models. However, the existing literature using traditional models consider each Decision-Making Unit (DMU) as a “black box” without taking the internal structure into account, but in fact, it is more accurate for formulating the scheme when considering the inner operation of DMUs. This paper investigates the allocation plan of carbon emission right among each province in China from 2007–2016 based on a two-stage DEA model. The results indicate that, first, there is no space for carbon emission in the north, northeast, and northwest from 2007–2016, while in the southern regions, it always exists. In addition, the carbon emission permits of the southern and eastern regions are increasing, but in the southwestern regions, the carbon emission space barely fluctuated during this decade. Second, the potential of carbon emission reduction of each region tends to be stable after 2014, and in the north and northwest, it fluctuated greatly from 2007–2016. Besides, the northwest region has had the potential of emission reduction since 2010, while it also exists in the northern region after 2014.

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“…Their approach considered the production level from a size point of view and is always feasible under both variable returns to scale and constant returns to scale properties. Yu et al (2016), Zhu et al (2017) and Li et al (2018b) extended the fixed cost allocation problem to network situations by considering the internal two-stage processes, all three methods are implemented under the efficiency-maximization assumption. Li et al (2018e) considered the feasibility of possible allocation plans and suggested a new non-egoistic principle, which states that each DMU should propose its allocation proposal in such a way that the maximal cost would be allocated to itself.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Allocating the fixed cost: an approach based on data envelopment analysis and cooperative game

Liu

Emrouznejad

et al. 2018

Ann Oper Res

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Allocating the fixed cost among a set of users in a fair way is an important issue both in management and economic research. Recently, Du et al. (2014) proposed a novel approach for allocating the fixed cost based on the game cross-efficiency method by taking the game relations among users in efficiency evaluation. This paper proves that the novel approach of Du et al. (2014) is equivalent to the efficiency maximization approach of Li et al. (2013), and may exist multiple optimal cost allocation plans. Taking into account the game relations in the allocation process, this paper proposes a cooperative game approach, and uses the nucleolus as a solution to the proposed cooperative game. The proposed approach in this paper is illustrated with a dataset from the prior literature and a real dataset of a steel and iron enterprise in China.

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A fixed cost allocation based on the two-stage network data envelopment approach

Cited by 39 publications

References 21 publications

A bargaining game model for measuring efficiency of two-stage network DEA with non-discretionary inputs

A bargaining game model for measuring efficiency of two-stage network DEA with non-discretionary inputs

Carbon Emission Allocation in a Chinese Province-Level Region Based on Two-Stage Network Structures

Allocating the fixed cost: an approach based on data envelopment analysis and cooperative game

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