A field study on matching with network externalities

Abstract

provided helpful conversations and feedback. We thank three anonymous referees for many useful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the National Science Foundation (SES 0963583) and the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.

Collaborate to Compete: An Empirical Matching Game Under Incomplete Information in Rank-Order Tournaments

“…An agent's payoff is usually assumed to be determined by the coalition she belongs to. In a more complex setting, the payoff can be determined by other coalitions, and the agent thus will react to other agents' coalition decisions under the competitive pressure (Yi, 1997;Wilson et al, 2010). Our study fits into the framework of a coalition game when externality exists.…”

“…A few other empirical studies consider either incomplete information or competition Ackerberg and Botticini (2002),. for example, relax the perfect information assumption and estimate contract determinants by explicitly embedding endogenous selection in the matching process Wilson et al (2010). extend the matching literature by incorporating externalities from network effects in faculty members' office choice Uetake and Watanabe (2017).…”