A Farewell to Tournaments? The Need for an Alternative Explanation of Law Firm Structure and Growth

Rutherglen, George; Kordana, Kevin A.

doi:10.2307/1073794

Cited by 5 publications

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“…Galanter and Palay (1991) coined the term ''tournament of lawyers'' to describe how law firms base their human resources strategy on a promotion-topartner competition to create greater leverage for the firm's human capital while preventing shirking by non-equity lawyers within the firm. The ''tournament,'' despite being questioned (for example, Rutherglen and Kordana, 1998;Wilkins and Gulati, 1998), is still widely accepted as an explanation for law firm recruitment and career policies (Bainbridge, 2004;Heinz et al, 2001;Sokol, 2007).…”

Section: Pressures On Professional Independencementioning

confidence: 99%

The Managerial Law Firm and the Globalization of Legal Ethics

Fasterling

2009

J Bus Ethics

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Section: Pressures On Professional Independencementioning

confidence: 99%

The Managerial Law Firm and the Globalization of Legal Ethics

Fasterling

2009

J Bus Ethics

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“…Kordana (1995) and Rutherglen and Kordana (1998) challenge the basic underlying assumption that associate output is difficult to monitor. They point out that it is not difficult to assess how hard associates are working because associates meticulously bill the hours they have worked.…”

Section: Critiques Of Tournament Theory As Applied To Law Firmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The standard tournament model assumes that a certain percentage of associates will be promoted to partnership each year. Yet this model ignores outside economic forces (Rutherglen & Kordana 1998; Nelson 1992). During poor economic times, firms may not be able to promote many associates to partnership.…”

Section: Critiques Of Tournament Theory As Applied To Law Firmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Kordana (1995) and Rutherglen and Kordana (1998) suggest that a production‐imperative model explains the relationships structuring law firm organization better than Galanter and Palay's application of tournament theory. Kordana suggests that firms hire associates in such numbers as they believe will be profitable in the long run, taking account of economic conditions and the demand for legal services (Kordana 1995; Rutherglen & Kordana 1998). Associates come to the firms because they offer salaries that are higher than the other options available to the associate coming out of law school.…”

Section: Critiques Of Tournament Theory As Applied To Law Firmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They are also intensely aware of their marketability outside of the firm, either at other firms or in a wide variety of possible occupations. The complex social interplay of these factors determines the organizing structure of law firms and the course of associate career patterns, rather than the tournament (Kordana 1995; Rutherglen & Kordana 1998).…”

Section: Critiques Of Tournament Theory As Applied To Law Firmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How Green Was My Valley? An Examination of Tournament Theory as a Governance Mechanism in Silicon Valley Law Firms

Price¹

2003

Law Soc Rev

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The tournament model is a widely used mechanism to control opportunistic behavior by associates in law firms. However, this mechanism can only operate in certain economic (and social) circumstances. When those circumstances do not exist, the model breaks down, and with it the ability to control opportunism in the absence of some alternative mechanism. Prior research has not investigated whether the utilization of a tournament model prevents the opportunistic behaviors identified as grabbing, leaving, and shirking. In order to test the limits of the tournament model, it is necessary to find particular historical moments when the economic environment radically challenges assumptions/premises of the model. The dot‐com bubble in Silicon Valley provides precisely such a time and place. This article demonstrates limits to the applicability of tournament theory. Those limits are to be found in the economic environment in circumstances in which: (1) exogenous reward structures offer many multiples of internal rewards; (2) demonstrably high short‐term rewards outside the firm starkly contrast with the delayed long‐term rewards inside the firm; (3) the managerial strata reduce their emphasis on long‐term recruiting of potential partners in favor of short‐term productivity by young associates; and (4) firms develop departmental leverage ratios in excess of their capacity to monitor, mentor, and train recruits.

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Fall from Grace or Business as Usual? A Retrospective Look at Lawyers on Wall Street and Main Street

Conley¹,

Baker²

2007

Law &Amp; Social Inquiry

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The individual practitioner of law in Chicago is a self-made man who came up the hard way from poor, immigrant surroundings." So began the serious empirical study of American law practice. The year was 1962 and the book was Lawyers on Their Own: The Solo Practitioner in an Urban Setting, by Jerome Carlin ([1962] 1994, p. 1). Carlin's book reported on a qualitative, interview-based study of 83 Chicago lawyers who practiced on their own. Two years later, Erwin Smigel (1964) came out with a compae rable study of the country's largest firms, The Wall Street Lawyer: Professional Organization Man? Then, in 1966, Carlin published Lawyers' Ethics: A Surwey of the New York City Bar, based on more than 800 interviews, which examined the ethical beliefs and practices of a cross section of New York lawyers. The picture that emerges from these three groundbreaking studies of law practice is straightforward. On Wall Street, in the biggest and most prestigious firms, things were good, at least for those who could get past the

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A Farewell to Tournaments? The Need for an Alternative Explanation of Law Firm Structure and Growth

Cited by 5 publications

References 0 publications

The Managerial Law Firm and the Globalization of Legal Ethics

The Managerial Law Firm and the Globalization of Legal Ethics

How Green Was My Valley? An Examination of Tournament Theory as a Governance Mechanism in Silicon Valley Law Firms

Fall from Grace or Business as Usual? A Retrospective Look at Lawyers on Wall Street and Main Street

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