A Dynamic Threat Prevention Framework for Autonomous Vehicle Networks based on Ruin-theoretic Security Risk Assessment

Abstract

In recent years, Autonomous Vehicle Networks (AVNs) have gained significant attention for their potential to make transportation safer and more efficient. These networks rely on Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication to exchange critical information, such as location, speed, and driving intentions. However, V2V communication also introduces security vulnerabilities that can be exploited to compromise the safety and privacy of drivers and passengers. Malicious or selfish drivers can potentially intercept, modify, and manipulate V2V communication, causing confusion among vehicles or stealing sensitive data. Therefore, in order to identify and mitigate security threats that could jeopardize V2V communication in AVNs, the implementation of a threat prevention framework is imperative. This paper presents a threat prevention framework that assesses security risks dynamically to facilitate secure message forwarding in V2V communication. First, we propose a dynamic risk assessment technique that utilizes the PIER approach to evaluate the level of security threats posed to V2V communication, and ultimately generate a risk score. Second, we develop a security decay assessment method that utilizes ruin theory to continuously monitor security risk within the AVNs. Third, we design a risk-aware message forwarding protocol based on coalitional game theory to facilitate secure V2V communication. Our experiments using the simulator Veins demonstrate the efficiency and scalability of the proposed framework in preventing potential damage caused by common security threats and enhancing the security of the Automated Highway System (AHS).