A Dynamic Price Game Model in a Low-Carbon, Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Return Rates and Fairness Concern Behaviors

Li, Qiuxiang; Shi, Mengnan; Huang, Yimin

doi:10.3390/ijerph16111978

Cited by 22 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 38 publications

(37 reference statements)

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“…And a case study utilizing real industrial data should be extended. ese extensions will help us come to a better understanding on the low-carbon supply chain operation in the future [27,28].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Carbon Emission Reduction Decision and Revenue-Sharing Contract with Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference and CER Cost under Carbon Tax

Han

Sui

et al. 2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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Since the tax of carbon emission is popular and consumers are exhibiting low-carbon preference, the green manufactures have to spend more extra cost on investing carbon emission reduction (CER) technology to decrease the carbon emission. To encourage the manufacture’s CER investment efforts, this paper explores the impact of carbon tax, CER cost, and consumers’ low-carbon preference on low-carbon decision-making and designs a revenue-sharing contract (RS) by constructing Stackelberg models. Based on the theoretical and numerical analysis, this paper finds that the supply chain would benefit from the increment of consumer’s environmental awareness but be depressed by the increase of the CER investment cost factor. Additionally, there exists a unique optimal carbon tax to make CER degree the maximum. Furthermore, RS can effectively promote manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions and also improve the supply chain efficiency.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Carbon Emission Reduction Decision and Revenue-Sharing Contract with Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference and CER Cost under Carbon Tax

Han

Sui

et al. 2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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“…Meanwhile, the influence of consumers' service quality preference on ESC and market demand is addressed. e study finds that, regardless of the channel power structure, the return rate does not affect the e-platform's service level (different from [28]). Increasing consumer service preferences will promote sales prices and service level (unlike [29]) and increase market demand and ESC profitability (unlike [30]).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 89%

Decisions of E-Commerce Supply Chain under Consumer Returns and Different Power Structures

Shen

Fan

Wang

2020

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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Considering the growing phenomenon of consumer returns and channel power struggles in e-commerce supply chains (ESCs), the ESC model is constructed and its equilibrium solutions are calculated and compared. Further, the consumer utility function is constructed to explore the impact of returns and dominant enterprises on consumer utility. Based on this, the “return cost-sharing and commission readjusting” contract is designed to maximize both ESC and consumer utility. Finally, the paper validates and further analyzes conclusions through numerical simulation. The main conclusions are as follows: higher return rates and return handling costs will reduce market demand and ESC profits, while higher salvage value of returned products will have a positive impact on ESC, but the above factors will not affect the online service level under decentralized decisions. The impact of consumer’s service quality preferences on manufacturer’s profits and e-commerce platform’s profit is determined by channel power structure. The impact of return rate on consumer utility depends on two factors: the decision-making model and the hidden cost of consumer returns.

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“…Zhang et al [ 18 ] discussed the optimal decision-making scheme of the supply chain in four decision-making backgrounds, but they only considered retailer’s fairness concern. Li et al [ 19 ] studied the dynamic price game of the low-carbon closed-loop supply chain system through considering the members’ fairness concern behavior. Li et al [ 36 ] studied the low-carbon double-channel supply chain and discussed the impact of fairness concern behavior on the price stability.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To our best of knowledge, only a few papers have simultaneously studied the impact of carbon emission limit and fairness concern on the optimal prices and carbon emission strategies of members in low-carbon supply chains [ 15 , 18 , 19 ]. However, most studies rarely incorporate both carbon quota policy and fairness concern into the decision-making process of LCSCs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Pricing Decisions for a Low-Carbon Supply Chain Considering Fairness Concern under Carbon Quota Policy

Zou

Qin

Dai

2021

IJERPH

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This research investigates the effect of fairness concerns on a sustainable low-carbon supply chain (LCSC) with a carbon quota policy, in which a manufacturer is in charge of manufacturing low-carbon products and sells them to a retailer. The demand is affected by price and the carbon emission reduction rate. The optimal decisions of pricing and carbon emission reduction rate are analyzed under four decision models: (i) centralized decision, (ii) decentralized decision without fairness concern, (iii) decentralized decision with manufacturer’s fairness concern, (iv) decentralized decision with retailer’s fairness concern. The results indicate that the profits in the centralized LCSC are higher than those in the decentralized LCSC with fairness concern. If a manufacturer pays close attention to fairness, the fairness concern coefficient will reduce the carbon emission reduction rate and the profit of the LCSC and increase the wholesale price and the retail price of the product. If a retailer pays close attention to fairness, and the preference of consumers for a low-carbon product is low, the fairness concern coefficient of the retailer increases the total profit of the LCSC and decreases the carbon emission reduction rate and retail price of the product. Otherwise, if the preference of consumers for a low-carbon product is great, the fairness concern coefficient of the retailer would lead to a lower retail price compared with the retail price in the centralized decision and decrease the total profit of the LCSC.

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A Dynamic Price Game Model in a Low-Carbon, Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Return Rates and Fairness Concern Behaviors

Cited by 22 publications

References 38 publications

Carbon Emission Reduction Decision and Revenue-Sharing Contract with Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference and CER Cost under Carbon Tax

Carbon Emission Reduction Decision and Revenue-Sharing Contract with Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference and CER Cost under Carbon Tax

Decisions of E-Commerce Supply Chain under Consumer Returns and Different Power Structures

Optimal Pricing Decisions for a Low-Carbon Supply Chain Considering Fairness Concern under Carbon Quota Policy

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