A Dynamic Bayesian Security Game Framework for Strategic Defense Mechanism Design

Farhang, Sadegh; Manshaei, Mohammad Hossein; Esfahani, M N; Zhu, Quanyan

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-12601-2_18

Cited by 29 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Game-theoretic models are natural frameworks to capture the adversarial and defensive interactions between players [9,14,15,20,21,37,66,72,77,83]. Game theory can provide a quantitative measure of the quality of protection with the concept of Nash equilibrium where both defender and an attacker seek optimal strategies, and no one has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from their equilibrium strategies despite their conflict for security objectives.…”

Section: Tutorial Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The tutorial will be organized to connect different classes of games with different sets of security problems. For example (1) Stackelberg and multi-layer games for proactive defense [8, 26, 68, 70-72, 76, 80, 82], (2) network games for cyber-physical security that deals with critical infrastructure protection and information assurance [3,15,21,36,54,[56][57][58][59][60], (3) dynamic games for adaptive defense for network security [9,16,17,24,66,67,78,79,81], (4) mechanism design theory for economics of network security that investigates resource allocation methodologies [2,5,11,13,61,64,[73][74][75], and (5) game-theoretic analysis of cryptographic concepts, such as perfectly confidentiality and authentication (in classical and quantum networks) [47][48][49][50], network design and -provisioning [30-32, 45, 46, 53] and quantitative security risk management [33-35, 38-44, 51, 52] From the perspective of cybersecurity, the topics of this tutorial will cover recent applications of game theory to several emerging topics such as cross-layer cyber-physical security [6,21,29,59,69,77], cyber deception…”

Section: Tutorial Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Game Theory Meets Network Security

Zhu

Raß

2018

Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

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The increasingly pervasive connectivity of today's information systems brings up new challenges to security. Traditional security has accomplished a long way toward protecting well-defined goals such as confidentiality, integrity, availability, and authenticity. However, with the growing sophistication of the attacks and the complexity of the system, the protection using traditional methods could be costprohibitive. A new perspective and a new theoretical foundation are needed to understand security from a strategic and decision-making perspective. Game theory provides a natural framework to capture the adversarial and defensive interactions between an attacker and a defender. It provides a quantitative assessment of security, prediction of security outcomes, and a mechanism design tool that can enable security-by-design and reverse the attacker's advantage. This tutorial provides an overview of diverse methodologies from game theory that includes games of incomplete information, dynamic games, mechanism design theory to offer a modern theoretic underpinning of a science of cybersecurity. The tutorial will also discuss open problems and research challenges that the CCS community can address and contribute with an objective to build a multidisciplinary bridge between cybersecurity, economics, game and decision theory. CCS CONCEPTS• Security and privacy → Network security; • Mathematics of computing; • Theory of computation → Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design;

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Section: Tutorial Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Tutorial Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game Theory Meets Network Security

Zhu

Raß

2018

Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

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“…An optimal defense strategy based on the stochastic game theoretic scheme is reported in Jiang et al 11 Farhang et al 12 modeled a Bayesian game to analyze the interactions between a server and its end user, that is, either a legitimate user or an attacker, where the optimal strategy of the defender only depends on the attackers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Integration of the interactive behaviors among the attackers, defenders and users with game theoretic approach is proposed in Ryutov et al 10 The advantage is that for the first time, users are considered as the independent players, where their incentives and behaviors affect the game process. An optimal defense strategy based on the stochastic game theoretic scheme is reported in Jiang et al 11 Farhang et al 12 modeled a Bayesian game to analyze the interactions between a server and its end user, that is, either a legitimate user or an attacker, where the optimal strategy of the defender only depends on the attackers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cyber security based on mean field game model of the defender: Attacker strategies

2017

International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks

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The transmission process of information among computers of network is considered as the procedure of interactive behaviors. In this article, we present a mean field game model for the binary interactive behaviors between the malicious attackers and the defenders. We first discuss the evolution of the states of the malicious attackers and the defenders using the susceptiable-infective-Removal epidemic model in which we take into account the stochastic process of the propagation of the infected computers and the attack intensity. Then, we formulate the mean field game consistency stability problem generated by a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of the individual player and the fixed-point problem. Finally, we derive the optimal individual strategy with an appropriate assumption that the response time of the defense system is faster than the infection rate.

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“…We model the interaction between the cloud and the connected device using a signaling game, which provides a framework for modeling dynamic interactions in which one player operates based on a belief about the private information of the other. A significant body of research has utilized this framework for security [7,9,15,21,8]. The signaling and FlipIt games are coupled, because the outcome of the FlipIt game determines the likelihood of benign and malicious attackers in the robotic signaling game.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Flip the Cloud: Cyber-Physical Signaling Games in the Presence of Advanced Persistent Threats

Pawlick

Farhang

Zhu

2015

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Access to the cloud has the potential to provide scalable and cost effective enhancements of physical devices through the use of advanced computational processes run on apparently limitless cyber infrastructure. On the other hand, cyber-physical systems and cloud-controlled devices are subject to numerous design challenges; among them is that of security. In particular, recent advances in adversary technology pose Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) which may stealthily and completely compromise a cyber system. In this paper, we design a framework for the security of cloud-based systems that specifies when a device should trust commands from the cloud which may be compromised. This interaction can be considered as a game between three players: a cloud defender/administrator, an attacker, and a device. We use traditional signaling games to model the interaction between the cloud and the device, and we use the recently proposed FlipIt game to model the struggle between the defender and attacker for control of the cloud. Because attacks upon the cloud can occur without knowledge of the defender, we assume that strategies in both games are picked according to prior commitment. This framework requires a new equilibrium concept, which we call Gestalt Equilibrium, a fixed-point that expresses the interdependence of the signaling and FlipIt games. We present the solution to this fixed-point problem under certain parameter cases, and illustrate an example application of cloud control of an unmanned vehicle. Our results contribute to the growing understanding of cloud-controlled systems.

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A Dynamic Bayesian Security Game Framework for Strategic Defense Mechanism Design

Cited by 29 publications

References 8 publications

Game Theory Meets Network Security

Game Theory Meets Network Security

Cyber security based on mean field game model of the defender: Attacker strategies

Flip the Cloud: Cyber-Physical Signaling Games in the Presence of Advanced Persistent Threats

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