A directional wave measurement attack against the Kish key distribution system

Gunn, Lachlan J.; Allison, Andrew; Abbott, Derek

doi:10.1038/srep06461

Cited by 31 publications

(79 citation statements)

References 25 publications

(59 reference statements)

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“…The theoretical basis of GAA's assertion [1] is the fact that, whereas wave-guides usually have a low-frequency cut-off for wave modes versus the diameter of the wave-guide, no such cut-off exists for transversal electromagnetic (TEM) wave modes in the case of infinitely long wave-guides. GAA write that, because coaxial cables have TEM wave modes, there is no frequency cut-off of the wave-based component of the electrical transport down to zero frequency.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do Electromagnetic Waves Exist in a Short Cable at Low Frequencies? What Does Physics Say?

et al. 2014

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Abstract.We refute a physical model, recently proposed by Gunn, Allison and Abbott (GAA) [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1402.2709v2.pdf], to utilize electromagnetic waves for eavesdropping on the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution. Their model, and its theoretical underpinnings, is found to be fundamentally flawed because their assumption of electromagnetic waves violates not only the wave equation but also the Second Law of Thermodynamics, the Principle of Detailed Balance, Boltzmann's Energy Equipartition Theorem, and Planck's formula by implying infinitely strong blackbody radiation. We deduce the correct mathematical model of the GAA scheme, which is based on impedances at the quasi-static limit. Mathematical analysis and simulation results confirm our approach and prove that GAA's experimental interpretation is incorrect too.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do Electromagnetic Waves Exist in a Short Cable at Low Frequencies? What Does Physics Say?

et al. 2014

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“…Turning now to GAA's experiments [1], Z c 2 is about 10 5 times smaller than before while their RA and RB have similar values (1 kΩ and 10 kΩ, respectively). With the same Noc as above and using the old method [3] together with GAA's parameters, Eve's probability of successful bit guessing would be [6] 0.5000002…”

Section: General Considerationsmentioning

confidence: 75%

“…We have shown that GAA's approach [1] is invalid and that their experimental results must be caused by artifacts. Nevertheless, a correct interpretation of GAA's results is very enlightening because it shows clearly that nonlinearities, non-Gaussianity (even a weak one), aliasing effects and parasitic currents constitute very dangerous potential non-idealities in a practical KLJN system.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 98%

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On the “Cracking” Scheme in the Paper “A Directional Coupler Attack Against the Kish Key Distribution System” by Gunn, Allison and Abbott

Chen¹,

Kish²,

Granqvist³

et al. 2014

Metrology and Measurement Systems

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Recently, Gunn, Allison and Abbott (GAA) [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1402.2709v2.pdf] proposed a new scheme to utilize electromagnetic waves for eavesdropping on the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution. We proved in a former paper [Fluct. Noise Lett. 13 (2014) 1450016] that GAA's mathematical model is unphysical. Here we analyze GAA's cracking scheme and show that, in the case of a loss-free cable, it provides less eavesdropping information than in the earlier (Bergou)-Scheuer-Yariv mean-square-based attack [Kish LB, Scheuer J, Phys. Lett. A 374:2140-2142 (2010)], while it offers no information in the case of a lossy cable. We also investigate GAA's claim to be experimentally capable of distinguishing-using statistics over a few correlation times only-the distributions of two Gaussian noises with a relative variance difference of less than 10 -8. Normally such distinctions would require hundreds of millions of correlations times to be observable. We identify several potential experimental artifacts as results of poor KLJN design, which can lead to GAA's assertions: deterministic currents due to spurious harmonic components caused by ground loops, DC offset, aliasing, non-Gaussian features including non-linearities and other non-idealities in generators, and the timederivative nature of GAA's scheme which tends to enhance all of these artifacts.

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“…The present paper concerns the classical statistical-physicsbased Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) key distribution system, delineated in Figure 1, which is no exception to the tradition of the research area, and the creation of the KLJN schemes [3,4] immediately triggered attacks [5][6][7]. The various attacks [5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16] have led to useful discussions [17][18][19][20][21][22][23], including corrections of flaws in the attacks [19][20][21][22][23] and developments of new defense protocols [5,10,11,13,24,25] as well as protocols that have increased immunity against attacks in general [24][25][26][27]. Furthermore, KLJN schemes that are totally immune to a certain attack have been presented [13,[28][29][30] as has a new system that is immune to all existing attacks [31].…”

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confidence: 99%

Comments on “A New Transient Attack on the Kish Key Distribution System”

Kish¹,

Granqvist²

2016

Metrology and Measurement Systems

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A recent IEEE Access Paper by Gunn, Allison and Abbott (GAA) proposed a new transient attack against the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system. The attack is valid, but it is easy to build a defense for the KLJN system. Here we note that GAA's paper contains several invalid statements regarding security measures and the continuity of functions in classical physics. These deficiencies are clarified in our present paper, wherein we also emphasize that a new version of the KLJN system is immune against all existing attacks, including the one by GAA.

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A directional wave measurement attack against the Kish key distribution system

Cited by 31 publications

References 25 publications

Do Electromagnetic Waves Exist in a Short Cable at Low Frequencies? What Does Physics Say?

Do Electromagnetic Waves Exist in a Short Cable at Low Frequencies? What Does Physics Say?

On the “Cracking” Scheme in the Paper “A Directional Coupler Attack Against the Kish Key Distribution System” by Gunn, Allison and Abbott

Comments on “A New Transient Attack on the Kish Key Distribution System”

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