A Dilemma for the Knowledge Despite Falsehood Strategy

Abstract

One strategy for dealing with apparent cases of knowledge from falsehood is to deny that the knowledge actually is from a falsehood. Those endorsing such a move have suggested that cases of knowledge from falsehood are instead cases of knowledge despite falsehood. We here provide a dilemma for those wanting to reject the possibility of knowledge from falsehood. The dilemma is explained in part by examining recent attempts to deny that knowledge can be inferentially derived from falsehood.

Ways to Knowledge-First Believe

“…This assumption is widely accepted, but not uncontroversial. See, e.g., Buford and Cloos (2018); Schnee (2015); Turri (2019); Warfield (2005) for discussion.…”

Knowledge, false belief, and reductio

“…And so the cases are not counterexamples to (No False Belief), after all. 3 I am sympathetic to the standard response. 4 However, in this paper, I present a new kind of counterexample to (No False Belief).…”

“…And thus, the cases also seem to be counterexamples to the related principle of counterclosure, which says that one cannot inferentially come to know a proposition from an inference relying on unknown premises. See Luzzi (2010) 3. In fact, one of the leading voices on the other side of the debate also relies on such an observation Klein (2008),.…”

Knowledge from Falsehood, Ignorance of Necessary Truths, and Safety

“…The case is originated fromGettier (1963).5 This case is adapted fromBaumann (2014) andMurphy (2017) though for a different purpose. For other cases of knowledge from falsehood, seeArnold (2013),Buford and Cloos (2018),Clark (1963), de Almeida (2017),Feit and Cullison (2011), Fitelson (2010),Hawthorne and Rabinowitz (2017),Hiller (2013),Hilpinen (1988),Klein (2008),Saunders and Champawat (1964),Turri (2012Turri ( , 2019,Warfield (2005).…”