A differential game for basin ecological compensation mechanism based on cross-regional government-enterprise cooperation

Ding, Jianpeng; Chen, Liuxin; Deng, Menghua; Chen, Junfei

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2022.132335

Cited by 22 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Marketization of ecological compensation is promoting in China, with the intention of strengthening the role of the market. In the process of market transactions, it is crucial to focus on inter‐regional government–enterprise coordination and local government–enterprise cooperation (Ding et al, 2022), making ecological compensation between north and south fairer and more effective. In addition, from the view of supply–demand ESs, building ES management to enhance well‐being is the key to achieving regional sustainable development (Wang et al, 2019).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Virtual built‐up land transfers and induced ecosystem service potential loss embodied in China's inter‐regional trade

Weng,

Bai,

Chen

et al. 2023

Land Degrad Dev

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Inter‐regional trade can potentially extend the management of resources and induced ecological environmental impacts beyond a region's territory along supply chains. We combined environmental‐extended multi‐regional input–output analysis and ecosystem services value (ESV) assessment, to identify the remote connections of construction land use and the induced ecosystem services potential loss in inter‐provincial trade in China from 2007 to 2017. The findings indicated that the virtual construction land flow increased by 0.774 million ha in the eight regions of China during 2007–2017. The Northeast and the Northwest were net exporters while most of the inflow areas were in the more developed areas such as Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei and the Yangtze River Delta. The net regional flow of ecosystem service potential loss (ESPL) in China increased by 352.64 billion yuan. The spatial heterogeneity of ESV in each province led to differences in the inter‐sectoral or inter‐regional flow characteristics of ESPL from embodied construction land use. The outflow areas of ESPL were mostly located in the old industrial bases of the Northeast and Northern Coast, which sacrificed their local ecological service value to meet the development needs of Southern Coast, Southwest China and Beijing–Tianjin. The research results help to clarify ecological and environmental responsibility, improve ecological compensation mechanisms and formulate scientific policies for coordinated protection of ecosystem services.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Virtual built‐up land transfers and induced ecosystem service potential loss embodied in China's inter‐regional trade

Weng,

Bai,

Chen

et al. 2023

Land Degrad Dev

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“…Non-cooperative games are more susceptible to information dominance by players, which may lead to an uneven distribution of eco-compensation among stakeholders [20]. Accordingly, related studies have introduced the cooperative game, i.e., all players form an interest alliance to maximize the eco-compensation of a watershed, aiming to improve the water quality and water use efficiency [21].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, continuing to subsidize becomes more of a financial burden. For this reason, Ding et al [20] proposed a game model regarding government-business cooperation to enhance the sustainability of compensation based on environmental performance targets. However, the effectiveness of cooperative games can be limited by differences in watershed economic development, pollution control, and management models, that make it difficult to achieve a long-term and solid alliance [16].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

System Dynamics-Based Game Theoretical Analysis for Watershed Eco-Compensation Design: A Case Study in Tuojiang River, Sichuan Province, China

Min,

Yu,

Zhao

et al. 2023

Land

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Eco-compensation is an important policy tool to trade off economic development and environmental protection in a watershed. This study introduced the gross ecosystem product (GEP) accounting system to identify the eco-compensation provider (ECP) and eco-compensation receiver (ECR) of a river basin. Then, a cooperative game model and a non-cooperative game model between the ECP and the ECR were established, in which system dynamics was incorporated into the game theoretical analysis to aid selection of the optimal compensation scheme. The study further demonstrated the model applications by taking the Tuojiang River Basin as a case. The results showed that the accounted GEP increased from CNY 32.2 billion in 2018 to CNY 35.5 billion in 2020, with a growth rate of 10.2%. Deyang City, as an ECP, had a cumulative difference of CNY 11.759 billion between its accounted GEP and actual GEP output over the three years. Neijiang City, Zigong City, and Luzhou City were taken as the ECR, receiving the GEP revenues as CNY 11.289 billion, 7.661 billion, and 1.497 billion, respectively. Chengdu City changed from the ECP to the ECR and ultimately to the ECP. However, Ziyang City and Meishan City changed from the ECP to the ECR. The eco-compensations increased to varying degrees during 2018–2020 in both game scenarios, with ECP payments and ECR revenues increasing by 16.5% and 4.6% in the non-cooperative game and by 5.0% and 50.8% in the cooperative game. Particularly, the eco-compensation obtained by the cooperative game had better environmental and economic performance, as there was a total of CNY 7.049 billion being saved. However, there was no savings of compensation by the non-cooperative game. It is expected that the results may provide insight into the design of the eco-compensation standard for a river basin.

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“…Artificial administrative boundaries cannot impede the spread of regional environmental issues, and the governance of water pollution is not solely the concern of individual cities. In the face of complex regional environmental governance challenges, it requires collaborative efforts among governments across regions [15,16]. Thus, the establishment of a cooperative governance mechanism involving multiple cities, departments, and regions is a necessary strategy for addressing water pollution issues [17,18].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Structural Characteristics of Intergovernmental Water Pollution Control Cooperation Networks Using Social Network Analysis and GIS in Yangtze River Delta Urban Agglomeration, China

Lin,

Tian,

Yao

et al. 2023

Sustainability

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Water pollution exhibits distinct negative externalities, necessitating trans-regional collaborative governance among basin governments. However, few studies have examined the structural features of water pollution collaboration networks among local governments in China from a spatial analysis perspective. This study focuses on 27 central cities in the Yangtze River Delta, collecting 109 policy texts and evidence of cooperative actions on water pollution governance among these cities. By utilizing a combination of social network analysis and GIS spatial analysis, the research visualizes the results and delves into the overall structure and internal features of the network. The results indicate that the density of the water pollution cooperation network is 0.75, suggesting that a relatively stable and closely connected network for collaborative governance of water pollution has been formed. Furthermore, the water pollution cooperation in the Yangtze River Delta exhibits a typical “multi-center” network structure, with Shanghai–Suzhou, Nanjing, and Hangzhou as the core, forming three city clusters with tighter cooperation. Suzhou, Shanghai, and Jiaxing have the highest degree of centrality, which are 51, 46, and 44, respectively. The analysis of degree centrality reveals that cities with higher levels of economic development or those that serve as provincial capitals often play a leading role in the cooperation network. The study also observes that adjacent cities or local governments closer to the core cities are more likely to establish cooperative relationships; this phenomenon is not limited by provincial administrative boundaries.

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A differential game for basin ecological compensation mechanism based on cross-regional government-enterprise cooperation

Cited by 22 publications

References 16 publications

Virtual built‐up land transfers and induced ecosystem service potential loss embodied in China's inter‐regional trade

Virtual built‐up land transfers and induced ecosystem service potential loss embodied in China's inter‐regional trade

System Dynamics-Based Game Theoretical Analysis for Watershed Eco-Compensation Design: A Case Study in Tuojiang River, Sichuan Province, China

Structural Characteristics of Intergovernmental Water Pollution Control Cooperation Networks Using Social Network Analysis and GIS in Yangtze River Delta Urban Agglomeration, China

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