2013
DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2013.05.002
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A differential game approach to information security investment under hackers’ knowledge dissemination

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Cited by 27 publications
(18 citation statements)
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“…Their analyses revealed that the nature of information assets, either complementary or substitutable, had a significant influence on the two firms' information security investment strategies. Gao et al (2013) considered firms' information security investment under Cournot and Bertrand competition and constructed a differential game in which over time hackers became knowledgeable by propagating security knowledge and firms could inhibit it by investing in information security. Their findings showed that higher effectiveness of inhibiting knowledge dissemination did not mean a higher investment.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Their analyses revealed that the nature of information assets, either complementary or substitutable, had a significant influence on the two firms' information security investment strategies. Gao et al (2013) considered firms' information security investment under Cournot and Bertrand competition and constructed a differential game in which over time hackers became knowledgeable by propagating security knowledge and firms could inhibit it by investing in information security. Their findings showed that higher effectiveness of inhibiting knowledge dissemination did not mean a higher investment.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In addition, the existing literature obtained the optimal strategy by analyzing the influence of influencing factors on investment decisions. Gao et al (2013) considered hackers' behaviors and analyzed their impact on information security investment decision making of substitutable enterprise. The hackers' behavior can directly affect the level of enterprise information security technology and enterprise information security behavior, thus affecting the enterprise information security investment decisions.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The rst question is mainly approached with traditional decision analysis including utility theory or value-at-risk approaches [29], e.g., in [21], [1] or [30]. The third question regarding the e ectiveness of the information security investment has been addressed in literature with game theory [29], e.g., in [10,16,17] or [41]. The rst and third question will not be addressed in this paper.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%