A (Different) Virtue Epistemology

because q), for some q. 2 Such knowledge can be also acquired via testimony. Thus, (K-WHY ≠ CAS).Pritchard's argument for (U-WHY = CAS) is based on two assumptions: (i) Having a sound explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related is a necessary requirement for understanding-why. (ii) Having (p because q) information is not equivalent to having such an explanatory story. He then argues that having an explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related is a kind of CAS and that therefore (U-WHY = CAS).These arguments can be questioned in at least two different ways. Stephen Grimm (2006Grimm ( , 2014, Christoph Kelp (2014), andPaulina Sliwa (2015) argue that coming to believe that (p because q) also requires having an explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related. If they were right, Pritchard's argument for (K-WHY ≠ CAS) would fail, according to his own criteria. If having an explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related is a kind of CAS, then (K-WHY = CAS) and (U-WHY = CAS). Grimm (2012), Daniel Whiting (2012), and J. Adam Carter and Emma Gordon (2014) argue that having an explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related is not a kind of CAS. If so, Pritchard's argument for (U-WHY = CAS) would fail. Then, it seems that (K-WHY ≠ CAS) and (U-WHY ≠ CAS). Either way, being a kind of CAS would not be a feature that sets understanding-why apart from knowledge-why. So, the crucial questions are: Does acquiring (p because q) information require having an explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related? Is having an explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related a kind of CAS?In this paper, I argue that both questions should be answered in the negative. After introducing the concept of a CAS (section 2) and after presenting Pritchard's argument for (K-WHY ≠ CAS) in more detail (section 3), I first elaborate on the explanatory story requirement (section 4). Having a sound explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related is to have information about facts or principles that establish the causal connections between the phenomena in question. Then, I make a positive case for the claim that coming to believe that (p because q), for some q, does not 2 I use round brackets to avoid scope ambiguities with respects to 'know'. 3/33require having a sound explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related, and I rebut

Section: The Explanatory Story Requirementmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Defining the notion of the decisive factor in more detail has proven to be challenging (for proposals see, e.g., Turri 2011;Greco 2012). For our purposes, a rough outline suffices: Successes are excluded that involve so-called intervening luck.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding why, knowing why, and cognitive achievements

Lawler

2018

“…Virtue reliabilists (e.g. Sosa 2010Sosa , 2015Greco 1999Greco , 2003Greco , 2012 view intellectual virtues as reliable abilities or faculties, which qualify as intellectual virtues in so far as they predominantly issue epistemic goods such as knowledge, and allow one to achieve truth. 2 Representative examples include perception, inference, and memory.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recently, the notion of intellectual virtue has gained popularity in epistemology, especially with those epistemologists who regard intellectual virtues as offering new possibilities for addressing traditional epistemological problems within the theory of knowledge (e.g. Zagzebski 1996;Sosa 2007Sosa , 2010Greco 2010Greco , 2012. 1 The virtue-based approach in epistemology, known as virtue epistemology, is divided into two main camps: virtue reliabilism, and virtue responsibilism.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Situationism, virtue epistemology, and self-determination theory

Iizuka

2018

Situationists (e.g., Doris in Lack of character: personality and moral behavior, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002; Harman in Proc Aristot Soc 99:315-331, 1999. https://doi.org/10.2307/4545312), with reference to empirical work in psychology, have called into question the predictive and explanatory power of character traits and on this basis have criticized the empirical adequacy of moral virtue. More recently, Alfano (Philos Q 62(247):223-249, 2012; Character as moral fiction, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013) has extended the situationist critique from virtue ethics to virtue epistemology. On the line he advances, virtue responsibilism-the view that intellectual character traits play an important part in traditional and untraditional epistemological inquiries-is criticized as empirically inadequate in light of the extent to which individuals are shown to be susceptible to seemingly trivial and epistemically irrelevant situational influences. Alfano's attempted redeployment of the situationist challenge to virtue responsibilism is on closer inspection not as straightforward as he claims. It is granted that the empirical adequacy of virtue responsibilism will be eventually threatened if it can be shown that virtuous motivation is, in light of situational factors, causally ineffective. As it turns out, various psychological studies which situationists have overlooked, suggest that virtuous motivation is causally efficacious in a way that favours the position of the virtue responsibilist over the situationist. In the first part of this paper, I outline the hard core of virtue theory: both a rich motivation requirement, and a commitment to the inherent relation between virtue and a good life; then I assess whether these are undermined by situationist criticism. I address the confusion of the existing debate, and the conclusion drawn is that virtue theory ultimately remains unscathed. In the second part of my 123Synthese paper I defend the empirical adequacy of virtue theory based on self-determination theory. When we afford closer attention to studies on the orientation of our motivation, it becomes clear how the dynamics of our motivation have a tremendous influence on desirable behavioural outcomes: a good life.

“…A number of authors have also suggested that Craig's account naturally fits with the knowledge norm for practical reasoning. (Greco 2008(Greco , 2012, (Hannon 2013), (McKenna 2013(McKenna , 2014. …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Knowing-how, showing, and epistemic norms

Habgood‐Coote

2017

General rightsThis document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms KNA: It is permissible to assert that p, only if one knows that p. 1 This norm says that an agent's assertion is permissible only if she knows what she says. If a speaker says that something which is false, unjustified or not known, then there is something inappropriate about that assertion. Crucially, KNA makes a claim about epistemic permission: an ignorant or false assertion can still be morally or prudentially 1 The knowledge-norm of assertion is formulated in several different ways: as an imperative or must claim (Williamson 2000: 241-3), as a claim about appropriateness (Brown 2008a), or as a claim about permissibility (Turri 2011: 37). There is also debate about whether the norm should also encompass the sufficiency claim (Brown 2008a(Brown , 2008b(Brown , 2010(Brown , 2012). I will not consider these issues since the counterexamples to the knowledge-norm of showing concern the necessity of know-how for appropriate showing, and will cause problems to any of these formulations.2 permissible, and a knowledgeable assertion can still be morally or prudentially impermissible. 2 Buckwalter and Turri (henceforth B&T) have recently opened up a parallel question about the epistemic permissibility of showing, claiming that 'just as knowledgethat is the norm of telling, so knowledge-how is the norm of showing ' (2014: 17). This is an important proposal, which if correct would offer insight into the normative significance of knowledge-how, deepen and widen the debate about epistemic norms, and give us a picture of the commonalities between knowledge-how and knowledge-that.Although they don't offer a formulation of this norm, the parallel norm to KNA would be a knowledge-how norm of showing, which we'll call KNS for short: KNS: It is permissible to show someone how to V, only if one knows how to V. intentional showing. In a case in which A secretly watches B make a tomato rose without B's knowledge we can say that B showed A how to make a tomato rose (Hawley 2010: 402), but I take it that this is not the sense of 'showing' that figures in KNS. 4 Moreover, KNS only concerns showing-how, and not the kind of activity that is involved in showing 2 From this point on, I will use unqualified claims about permissibility to refer to epistemic permission. 3 Although KNS is only significant if it is possible to show without having know-how. This is a point we will return to in §3.3. 4 The fact that I focus on cases in which one person learns from another's teaching should not distract us from the fact that we can also acquire know-how through imitation, practice, and simple trial and error. Since our focus will be on the norms on interpersonal teaching, giving a full account of the ways in which we can acquire know-how is beyond the scope of this paper. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for rai...