A dialectical approach to presupposition

Abstract

This paper advances an approach to presupposition rooted in the concept of commitment, a dialectical notion weaker than truth and belief. It investigates ancient medieval dialectical theories and develops the insights thereof for analyzing how presuppositions are evaluated and why a proposition is presupposed. In particular, at a pragmatic level, presuppositions are reconstructed as the conclusions of implicit arguments from presumptive reasoning, grounded on presumptions of different type and nature. A false (or rather unaccepted) presupposition can be thus represented as the outcome of a conflict of presumptions – the ones used by the speaker and the ones commonly accepted or backed by evidence. From an interpretative perspective, this defaulted presumptive reasoning can be explained by comparing the available presumptions and repaired by replacing the weaker and unacceptable ones.

Metaphors and problematic understanding in chronic care communication

“…At any point of this continuum the common ground is not fully shared between interlocutors. This difference can be represented in terms of presumptions (Macagno, 2018a). While in intercultural communication the interlocutors cannot presume a large amount of information as part of the core common ground (the static, generalized, common repertoire of knowledge) (Kecskes and Zhang, 2013), in intracultural settings commonalities, conventions, standards and norms between speakers and hearers are usually taken for granted (Kecskes, 2013(Kecskes, , 2015(Kecskes, , 2016.…”

Argumentation profiles and the manipulation of common ground. The arguments of populist leaders on Twitter

“…However, one of the greatest vulnerabilities acknowledged in these automatic detection systems is the lack of biunivocal correspondence between expression and meaning (Pisarevskaya, 2017;Rubin and Lukoianova, 2015), and more importantly the failure to take into account other dimensions and types of manipulation, analyzed in the rhetorical and dialectical tradition under the label of "fallacies" (even the ones that are essentially related to hate speech, see Habernal et al, 2018). In this picture, the traditional fallacies become extremely relevant for detecting the hidden side of manipulative discourse (Walton, 1987(Walton, , 1999, namely the information taken for granted by the speakers and not shared by the audience (Lombardi Vallauri et al, 2020;Lombardi Vallauri and Masia, 2014;Macagno, 2018b).…”

“…Moreover, an argument is grounded on what the interlocutors take for granted (Stalnaker, 1998) e their implicit, dark-side commitments. However, arguments can rely on premises that are unshared, shifting onto the other party the burden of disproving that they are part of the common ground (Macagno, 2018b;.…”

Presupposition Triggers and Presumptive Interpretation

“…A commitment is an accepted proposition that, however, is defined in terms of its possibility of being retracted, denied, or questioned, and not directly in epistemological terms as a proposition treated as a possibly true or false. The propositional attitude is thus translated as a dialogical attitude (Macagno 2018). In this sense, a commitment is not necessarily a belief; rather, one accepts a statement when one asserts it and, in many contexts, when someone else asserts it to you and you do not object (Mackenzie and Staines 1999, 17;Hamblin 1970, 264;Geurts 2017).…”

“…1 His approach can be interpreted in a dialogical perspective in terms of dialogical commitments that the speaker can attribute to the hearer based on presumptions. On this view, presuppositions can be regarded as propositions that the speaker treats as taken for granted, namely propositions that can be presumed as implicit commitments of the hearer (Geurts 1999, 4;Macagno 2018). This account is grounded on two basic ideas: (1) instead of analyzing presuppositions as true or false propositions, they can be described as commitments, which are attributed to the hearer and that the hearer can accept, accept provisionally, or reject (by rejecting the interlocutor's 1 Clearly, Strawson's later definition of presupposition (Strawson 1954) conflicts with the account of pragmatic presupposition (Reimer and Bezuidenhout 2004, 308;Stalnaker 1973Stalnaker , 1974Stalnaker , 2002.…”