A Definition of Subjective Probability

Anscombe, F. J.; Aumann, Robert J.

doi:10.1214/aoms/1177704255

Cited by 1,504 publications

(1,124 citation statements)

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“…Goodness of …t is assessed. In particular, we …nd support for explaining the data with four types, one behavioral type for each normative model together with an 1 A more thorough discussion of the link between questions and decision problems is in Subsection 4. 1. additional free type.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 65%

“…There are several di¤erent axiomatic models of decision making under uncertainty. We restrict our attention to the following three approaches: the subjective expected utility criterion (Savage, 1954, Anscombe andAumann, 1963), the maximin utility decision rule (Wald, 1950) and the minimax regret criterion (Savage, 1951).…”

Section: Choice Under Uncertaintymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Under the hypothesis that job pressure increases with the degree of uncertainty of the choice scenarios, preference for a job with not too much pressure is considered as a signal that investing in reducing uncertainty is valuable. 1 By establishing a link between the questions and the choice problems we can predict the responses of our three behavioral types to the EVS questions. In all three decision problems we …nd that choice varies across the di¤erent behavioral models.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Decision makers facing uncertainty: Theory versus evidence

Giordani

Schlag

Zwart

2010

Journal of Economic Psychology

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This paper aims at assessing cultural di¤erences in uncertainty attitude across Europe. We select questions from the European Values Survey (EVS) capturing salient features of uncertain scenarios ("safe versus uncertain", "freedom of choice" and "reduction of uncertainty"), and formalize these questions through simple decision-theoretic problems. We then consider three competing normative models of choice under uncertainty (subjective expected utility (SEU), maximin utility and minimax regret), and analyze how they behave when facing each decision problem. We obtain theoretical predictions and, using the EVS dataset, we test them via latent class analysis to estimate the distribution of these behaviors across EU15. We …nd a larger proportion of SEU maximizers (Bayesians) in northern countries than in southern countries. The opposite is true for maximin utility behavior. Only a few are consistent with minimax regret behavior.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 65%

Section: Choice Under Uncertaintymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Decision makers facing uncertainty: Theory versus evidence

Giordani

Schlag

Zwart

2010

Journal of Economic Psychology

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“…Herein, as was already pointed out in the introduction, we have to confine ourselves presently (for technical reasons) to the special case where there are only finitely many states of the world. The framework is along the lines of Anscombe and Aumann [1].…”

Section: Monotonic Bernoullian Archimedean (Mba) Preferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In particular, in our new notation, this means that (1) for all P ∈ P, if f P gP h, then for some a, b, P |= φ[a, b].…”

Section: Impossibility Of Arrovian Aggregation Of Mba Preferences 13mentioning

confidence: 99%

Aggregation of Monotonic Bernoullian Archimedean Preferences: Arrovian Impossibility Results

Herzberg

2013

SSRN Journal

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Abstract. Cerreia-Vioglio, Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Siniscalchi (Economic Theory, 48:341-375, 2011) have recently proposed a very general axiomatisation of preferences in the presence of ambiguity, viz. Monotonic Bernoullian Archimedean (MBA) preference orderings.This paper investigates the problem of Arrovian aggregation of such preferences -and proves dictatorial impossibility results for both finite and infinite populations. Applications for the special case of aggregating expected-utility preferences are given. A novel proof methodology for special aggregation problems, based on model theory (in the sense of mathematical logic), is employed.

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Belief and Preference in Decision Under Uncertainty

Fox

See

2003

Thinking: Psychological Perspectives on Reasoning, Judgment and Decision Making

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Most decisions in life are gambles. Should I speed up or slow down as I approach the yellow traffic light ahead? Should I invest in the stock market or in treasury bills? Should I undergo surgery or radiation therapy to treat my tumor? From mundane choices rendered with scarcely a moment's reflection to urgent decisions founded on careful deliberation, we seldom know in advance and with certainty what the consequences of our choices will be. Thus, most decisions require not only an assessment of the attractiveness of potential consequences, but also some appraisal of their likelihood of occurrence.Virtually all decision theorists agree that values and beliefs jointly influence willingness to act under uncertainty. However, there is considerable disagreement about how to measure values and beliefs, and how to model their influence on decisions. Our purpose in this chapter is to bring into sharper focus the role of values and beliefs in decision under uncertainty and contrast some recent developments in the descriptive modeling of choice under uncertainty with the classical normative model. The Classical Theory and the Sure-Thing PrincipleThe primitives of most decision theories are acts, states, and consequences (Savage, 1954; for an alternative approach, see Luce, 2000). An act is an action or option that yields one * The view of decision making under uncertainty outlined in this chapter was heavily influenced by the late Amos Tversky. Of course, any errors or deficiencies of the present work are entirely the responsibility of the authors. We thank

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A Definition of Subjective Probability

Cited by 1,504 publications

References 13 publications

Decision makers facing uncertainty: Theory versus evidence

Decision makers facing uncertainty: Theory versus evidence

Aggregation of Monotonic Bernoullian Archimedean Preferences: Arrovian Impossibility Results

Belief and Preference in Decision Under Uncertainty

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